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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study attempts to probe how reporting shaped perception of 
the Vietnam War with special reference to the watershed series of 
battles, commonly known as the Tet offensive of January, 1968. A 
further analysis and evaluation of media coverage for classroom use in 
formal schooling follows. 
The author's interviews of ten top journalists concerning the 
Tet offensive are at the core of the study supplemented by an analysis 
of a seminal set of interviews of jourjnalists conducted by Thomas R. 
Morgan in July 1984 on the Vietnam War. 
This treatment is further reflected in additional analysis of 
the replies given by journalists in 1987 to William McCloud's query 
"What Should We Tell Our Children About Vietnam" as recounted in 
American Herita~e. Relevant approaches from an extensive curriculum 
project entitled "Teaching the Vietnam War" as described and proposed in 
extenso in Social Education for 1988 are also discussed with particular 
reference to and emphasis upon the Tet offensive in the context of the 
Vietnam War in American history textbooks. 
Truth can be highly elusive, and especially in war. Vietnam now 
is regarded as an uncensored war, a war where journalists generally 
could compete against each other for news. 
1 
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A few definitions may be in order here. 
Journalism? Essentially, it is the reporting and writing of 
news. And good journalism has been described as the "first draft of 
history." Others often have called it "instant history." Too, it is a 
recording of factual events. 
News? Virtually every journalism textbook carries a definition. 
One definition developed by the author over thirty-five years is this: 
"That which is most meaningful and significant to the largest number of 
people at a given time." 
News? David Brinkley of ABC once gave this definition: "News 
is what we say it is." Some would disagree, as I do, with this 
definition and claim that Brinkley is too superficial and shallow. 
The reporting, writing and editing of news is a highly complex, 
but usually successful, operation--whether on TV, radio or in 
newspapers. 
Stephens and Lanson in their text, Writin& & Reportin&, list 
several generally accepted news determinants. Included are: 
•Impact 
•Controversy 
•Weight 
•Emotion 
•Uniqueness 
•Prominence 
•Proximity 
•Timeliness 
•Currency 
•Educational Value. 1 
All of these criteria are in various ways kept in focus for the 
journalists interviewed in this study. 
A prefatory comment seems perenially true as well. 
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War indeed is hell, and war is to be avoided at virtually any 
cost. The late U.S. Senator Hiram Johnson in 1917 said: "The first 
casualty when war comes is truth." 
That quote is from Phillip Knightley's book, The First Casualty 
which traced the role of the reporter-correspondent from the Crimean War 
through Vietnam. 2 
Dan Oberdorfer in his powerful book TET wrote both accurately 
and hauntingly. The book's frontispiece is worth quoting: 
DEDICATION 
For Those Who Died (January 29-March 31, 1968) 
3,895 officers and men of the United States Army, Air Force, 
Navy and Marine Corps. 
214 officers and men of the Republic of Korea & Forces, Vietnam; 
the Australian Force, Vietnam; the New Zealand Army Force, Vietnam; 
and the Royal Thai Military Assistance Group, Vietnam. 
4,954 officers and men of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 
( South Vietnam) . 
58,373 officers and men of the Vietnam People's Army (north 
Vietnam) and the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces 
(Viet Cong). 
14,300 civilian men, women and children of South Vietnam. 
And Those Who Live and Learn. 3 
The book's afterword is also worth quoting: 
The Tet Offensive was a dramatic and important event which 
clearly required a reconsideration of the strategy being followed. 
It caused the participants on all sides of the war to take a second 
look at their positions. In the United States Tet provided a 
rationale for turning around rather than going ever deeper into a 
war the nation was unwilling to pay for and many of its young men 
were unwilling to die for. In bewildering and awkward fashion, the 
people and private leadership of the United States made up their 
minds about the war at Tet, and they communicated their views 
forcefully to those in high public office. A democratic corrective 
was applied to a policy gone wrong--but only after terrible wounds 
had been inflicted which are likely to scar the nation for a 
generation. 
It has been said that war is a series of mistakes, and in this 
perspective it is fitting that the mistakes of the United States 
should take their toll in the United States. What has been done to 
Vietnam and the Vietnamese is another question. No matter which 
Vietnamese ultimately "win" this proxy war of the great powers, they 
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will have lost more than they have gained. Whoever wins must set 
about in his own way to bind up the wounds of a ravaged and divided 
nation, to salvage what is left of a way of life, to restore the old 
villages, the old pagodas and the old ways and to deal with the new 
cities and a new generation. The rice fields and fruit orchards are 
fertile and the people are resilient. They will find a way to deal 
with the past and the future, with or without our help. In the end 
it will be a Vietnamese solution, and we will probably never 
understand how it was reached. By then our nation, long since sick 
of the war, will have lost all interest in the outcome and will 
wonder why so many of our young men died so far away for a cause so 
few could name. 
After this dark age of Vietnamese history, those who survive 
could justly repeat to us, with reproach, the message presented by 
their forefathers to the first group of French sailqrs who ventured 
up the Saigon River a century ago, during the earliest stage of the 
European conquest. "Your country belongs to the western seas, ours 
to the eastern," the proclamation said. "As the horse and the 
buffalo differ, so do we--in language, literature, customs. If you 
persist in putting the torch to us, disorder will be long. But we 
shall act according to the laws of heaven, and our cause will 
triumph in the end. 4 
War is controversy. War is conflict and therefore news. Often, 
much news. 
This paper is aimed directly at examining the educational value 
of the extensive news coverage of Tet in the context of the Vietnam War. 
News reporting reaches the highest level of professionalism when it is 
neutral, objective and non-partisan. 
The primary function of reporters is to be fact-finders. It is 
at the heart, indeed of their very right to perform their craft. The 
reader, then, of a news story, about Tet or anything else, should 
ideally come away from the story without any idea of the religion, 
political beliefs or anything about the personal beliefs or background 
of the reporter. 
The primary role of a reporter simply is to tell it like it is. 
There is little latitude, then, for a liberal or conservative view of a 
military battle. The neutrality of the reportage should be at the core 
5 
of whether a teacher or scholar can trust the work to use it in a 
classroom or in research. 
The crux of this dissertation rests upon allegations by Peter 
Braestrup in the introduction to his Bi~ Story: 
Before and during Tet, as will be seen ... Lyndon Johnson, willy-
nilly, helped to create conditions that led to an unusual failure in 
U.S. crisis journalism. Six months prior to the Tet attacks, he 
orchestrated a "progress" campaign; to shore up public support, he 
and his subordinates presented an optimistic view of the 
Administration's limited war of attrition in Vietnam. Shortly 
before the Tet attacks, he received word from Saigon that Hanoi was 
planning a major battlefield effort of some sort; he did not warn 
the American people, but rather stressed his quest for "peace." 
When the Tet attacks came, he confined his initial reaction to a 
hastily called untelevised news conference several days later. He 
left the detailed explanations to subordinates. Amid the clamor of 
an election year, he took no retaliatory actions, e.g., more 
bombings or mining; instead he hunkered down, besieged, apparently 
trying to buy time. Finally, on March 31, he addressed the nation, 
announcing a new bombing pause, a new peace offer, and his 
withdrawal from the 1968 presidential race. For two months, he had 
left a vacuum--which others hastened to fill. Simply to describe 
the alarms and distortions of the TV and the press in February-
March 1968, as "deliberate" or "ideological" ignores both poor 
Administration performance and the President's own failure to 
respond decisively to the sudden turn of events in Vietnam. 
Possibly owing to the deep contradictions in his own "guns and 
butter" war policy, Johnson did not give the news media (or the 
public) a coherent scenario. In that sense, the President's 
political crisis in Washington after Tet was a self-inflicted 
wound. 5 
A key purpose of this dissertation is a direct analysis of the 
coverage and presentation of answers from experts. Those interviewed 
for this dissertation were selected because of their excellent reporting 
achievements. 
While the author did not report from Vietnam, he encountered 
many of the war correspondents reported during a 30-year career here in 
the United States. 
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The men and women interviewed generally have been praised for 
their professionalism and craftmanship. 
The following basic questions were asked of all those 
interviewed for this dissertation: 
* 1. Was the news coverage of the Tet military action reliable enough 
to be used by future teachers, students, and historians? If 
not, why not? 
2. Was there accurate enough coverage during Tet of President 
Johnson and his administration in Washington, D.C. and in 
Vietnam? If not, why not? 
3. What mistakes were made during Tet by the news media in Vietnam 
and Washington? 
4. Was Peter Braestrup accurate in his accusations of President 
Johnson's alleged "willy-nilly" conduct before and during Tet? 
5. Are the available radio, TV tapes and news accounts, periodicals 
and books on Tet accurate enough for use today by students, 
teachers and scholars? If not, why not? 
The study also proposes to assess with the advantage of 
additional perspective the ways in which textbooks, among other 
materials, reflected the accuracy and legitimacy of the news coverage. 
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CHAPTER I NOTES 
1Mitchell Stephens and Gerald Lanson, Writin& and Reportin& (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1986), 67-77. 
2Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), frontispiece. 
3oon Oberdorfer, TET! (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1971), 
frontispiece. 
4Ibid., 334-35. 
5Peter Braestrup, The Bi& Story (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, abridged ed., 1977), xii-xiii, xvii-xviii. 
CHAPTER II 
WHY TET AND WHY VIETNAM? 
Relevant Inquiry into the Evolvement of 
the Vietnam War and TET 
Tet impacted the entire world with a fury in early 1968. It was 
to be an effort for a final victory, somehow, for the Communists. It 
was to be a sign of valiant defense, courage and great determination for 
the Free World. 
It was not to be a time of half-measures for either side. 
It is also necessary to extensively reexamine the history of the 
entire region. The following serves to help explain that history. 
The Tet offensive needs to be examined in an historical context. 
It cannot be isolated alone in a 1968 time frame. There were major 
developments both before and after the military battles. 
It should be noted here that there were these pertinent 
preliminary incidents in December, 1967, and they should be considered a 
part of the brief chronology of Tet. First, General Earle Wheeler, 
chairman of the J.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned publicly, on December 
18, 1967, in Detroit of a possible enemy offensive. It was two days 
later on December 20, 1967, General Westmoreland privately told 
officials in Washington that the Communists had decided to try an all-
out win-the-war effort throughout South Vietnam. 
President Johnson was unpredictable in his behavior. He 
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privately told Australian officials at the White House on December 21, 
1967, that he expected "kamikaze attacks" but, later, in publicly 
discussing Vietnam fails to mention "kamikaze attacks." 
Peter Braestrup, in his book, Big Story. used the following as a 
brief chronology of the Tet period from January through March 31, 1968: 
Jan. 20: 
Jan. 22: 
Jan. 23: 
Jan. 29: 
Jan. 30: 
Jan. 31: 
Feb. 1: 
Feb. 2: 
Feb. 7: 
Feb. 8: 
Feb. 18: 
Feb. 24: 
Feb. 25: 
Feb. 27: 
Feb. 28: 
Mar. 1: 
Mar. 6: 
Mar. 10: 
Mar. 11: 
Mar. 12: 
Midmonth: 
Mar. 16: 
Siege of Khe Sahn begins. 
General Westmoreland tells NBC he expects major enemy 
effort around Tet holidays. 
North Koreans seize U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo. 
Tet holiday cease fire begins. Saigon's troops on 50 
percent holiday leave. Curfew lifted. 
Communists launch surprise attacks in II corps, hit Da 
Nang and Hai An in I corps. 
Attacks throughout South Vietnam, including the Ben Tre, 
Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the U.S. Embassy, and the 
Presidential Palace. 
General Westmoreland predicts more enemy attacks. 
President Johnson says Tet offensive was a military 
offensive, but predicts more hard fighting. 
Communists occupy the Lang Vei outpost near the Khe Sahn 
and continue battling in Hue and the outskirts but have 
withdrawn from other areas. 
Senator Robert Kennedy assails Johnson's policy. 
Communists gunners shell 45 cities and bases. 
Hue cleared of enemy forces. 
Westmoreland is optimistic during AP interview, but says 
he may need additional forces in the future. 
CBS's Walter Cronkite, in a special report, says 
negotiation is the only way to conclude the war. 
General Wheeler, after a Saigon trip, presents a complex 
206,000 troop request. Johnson orders a task force under 
incoming Defense Secretary Clark Clifford to study it. 
The Congress and the Johnson administration are divided 
on the war. 
Last Communist push at Khe Sahn is fought back. 
General Wheeler cables Westmoreland that it is almost 
impossible that troop increase will be allowed. 
New York Times reports exclusively that Westmoreland 
asked for 206,000 men "to regain the initiative." Frank 
McGee of NBC reports U.S. is losing the war. 
Newsweek magazine calls for peace and runs "Agony of Khe 
Sahn" feature. 
Senator Eugene McCarthy wins 42 percent of Democratic 
primary vote in New Hampshire. 
UPI reports that heavy bombing causes communists to pull 
back forces around Khe Sahn. 
Robert F. Kennedy announces candidacy for President. 
Mar. 21: 
Mar. 22: 
Mar. 30: 
Mar. 31: 
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Thieu announces 185,000-man Army increase. 
President Johnson announces Westmoreland will become Army 
Chief of Staff in mid-1968. 
President Johnson is at an all-time low in public 
approval for his performance, according to a Gallup poll. 
President Johnson gives first nationwide TV speech since 
Tet: he announces partial bombing pause, willingness to 
negotiate with Hanoi, and his decision not to run for 
reelection. 1 
Study of this calendar enables one to focus on both causes and 
effects. Any examination of Tet coverage should be balanced against the 
reportage of past wars and the entire Vietnam war itself. 
It is not the purpose here to review or analyze the entire war, 
but Tet can be evaluated for what it did and did not do. 
Stanley Karnow's Vietnam: A History can be used as a supplement 
to The Bi~ Story. Karnow provides a chronicle of Vietnam. To avoid 
duplication, the author has deleted in the following those incidents 
relating to Tet that Braestrup used. 
208 B.C. 
1st century 
B.C. 
A.D. 40 
967 
1428 
1460-98 
Chronolo&y of Vietnam 
Trieu Da, a renegade Chinese general, conquers Au Lac in 
the northern mountains of Vietnam, established a capitol, 
and proclaims himself emperor of "Nam Viet." 
Han dynasty expands and incorporates Nam Viet into the 
Chinese empire as the province of Giao Chi. 
Trung sisters lead insurrection against the Chinese and set 
up an independent state. 
Emperor Dinh Bo Linh ascends throne, calling his state Dai 
Co Viet. Period of independence follows. 
The Chinese recognize Vietnam's independence by signing an 
accord after nearly a decade of revolt led by Emperor Le 
Loi. 
Le Thanh Tong rules Vietnam. 
legal code and other reforms; 
Introduces comprehsnsive 
extends dominion southward. 
1545 
1627 
1772 
1787 
1802 
1820 
1843 
1847 
1861 
1862 
1863 
1878 
1879 
1883 
1887 
1890 
1911 
1918 
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Civil strife roils Vietnam, splitting the country for 
nearly two centuries. 
Alexandre de Rhodes, French missionary adapts Vietnamese 
language to Roman alphabet. Paves way for further French 
influence in Vietnam. 
Start of Tayson rebellion. Ruling Nguyen clan unseated. 
French missionary activity spreads. 
Pigneau De Behaine, French missionary, enlists support of 
Louis XVI to help a pretender to the throne. Nguyen Anh, 
regain control. France agrees to send men and material in 
exchange for exclusive commercial privileges, but later 
reneges. 
Gia Long (Nguyen Anh) becomes emperor of Vietnam and 
unifies the country. 
Captain John White of Salem, Massachusetts, is first 
American to set foot in Vietnam. 
Permanent French fleet deployed in Asian waters. 
Clash between French forces and Vietnamese mandarins in the 
city of Tourane, now Danang. Tu Due ascends throne with 
plans to eliminate Christianity in Vietnam. 
French forces capture Saigon. 
Tu Due signs treaty with French granting them broad 
religious, economic, and political concessions. 
French control extends to Cambodia. 
French inroads into Tonkin begin. 
Cochinchina's first French civilian governor is appointed. 
France establishes a "protectorate" over Annam and Tonkin, 
and rules Cochinchina as a colony. 
France creates Indochinese Union composed of Cochinchina, 
Annam, Tonkin, and Cambodia. 
Ho Chi Minh is born in central Vietnam. 
Ho leaves Vietnam, not to return for thirty years. 
Ho Chi Minh, then known as Nguyen Ai Quoc, arrives in 
Paris; remains there for next seven years. 
1919 
1920 
1924 
1930 
1932 
1936 
1941 
1944 
1945 
1946 
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Ho tries to petition President Woodrow Wilson, at the 
Versailles peace conference, for self-determination in 
Vietnam. 
Ho joins newly formed French Communist party in December. 
Ho leaves Paris for Moscow, becomes full-time Communist 
agent. Later goes to Canton as assistant to Mikhail 
Borodin, Soviet representative in China. 
Ho and comrades form Indochinese Communist Party in Hong 
Kong. 
Bao Dai, theoretically emperor since 1925, returns to 
Vietnam from school in France to ascend throne under French 
tutelage. 
Popular Front government in France sponsors short-lived 
liberal reforms in Vietnam. 
Ho returns to Vietnam covertly, forms the Vietminh to fight 
both Japan and France. 
Vo Nguyen Giap forms Vietminh army. 
Japanese take over French administration throughout 
Indochina, March 9. 
Bao Dai proclaims the independence of Vietnam under 
Japanese auspices, March 11. 
At Potsdam Conference in July, Allied leaders assign 
British to disarm Japanese in southern Vietnam; Chinese 
Nationalists to perform the same function north of the 
sixteenth parallel. 
Japanese transfer power in Indochina to the Vietminh, 
August 18. 
Bao Dai abdicates on August 23. 
Ho proclaims provisional government in Hanoi on August 19, 
with Bao Dai as supreme counselor. 
Japan formally surrenders to the Allies. He declares the 
independence of Vietnam, September 2. 
British forces under General Douglas Gracey land in Saigon 
on September 18; soon return authority to the French. 
Lieutenant Colonel A. Peter Dewey of the OSS is killed in 
Saigon, September 26, the first American to die in Vietnam. 
Indochinese Communist party dissolved in November, replaced 
by Association for Marxist Studies as Ho tries to broaden 
his base. 
Throughout the period, some two million Vietnamese die of 
famine in the north. 
China agrees to withdraw forces from Vietnam, and France 
concedes its extraterritorial rights in China. 
French and Vietminh reach accord in March; France 
1955 
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recognizes Vietnam as a "free state" within the French 
Union. French troops authorized to return to the north to 
replace the Chinese. A referendum to determine whether 
Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina should be reunited. 
Battle of Dienbienphu begins, March 13; French defeated at 
Dienbienphu, May 7. 
Eisenhower decides in April against American intervention 
to help France in Indochina after Britain rejects his 
proposal for concerted action. 
Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference opens in May 3, 
with Britain and Soviet Union as co-chairmen. 
Bao Dai selects Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister, June 16. 
Pierre Mendes-France, invested as prime minister of France, 
Jun 17, pledged to achieve a cease fire in Indochina within 
a month; goes to Bern to negotiate secretly with Zhou 
Enlai, Chinese foreign minister. 
Diem returns to Saigon, July 7. 
Agreements reached at Geneva in July call for cessation of 
hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Provisional 
demarcation line at seventeenth parallel divides Vietnam 
pending political settlement to be achieved through 
nationwide elections. Final declaration accepted orally by 
all participants at the conference except United States, 
which states it will not disturb the agreements but would 
view renewed aggression with concern. 
Bao Dai's government denounces agreements. 
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed, 
September 8, by United States, Britain, France, Australia, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and Philippines. 
French forces leave Hanoi, October 9. 
General J. Lawton Collins, Eisenhower's special envoy, 
arrives in Saigon to affirm American support for Diem, 
including $100 million in aid. Hundreds of thousands of 
refugees flee from the north to the south with help of U.S. 
Navy. 
United States begins to funnel aid directly to Saigon 
government in January, agrees to train South Vietnamese 
army. 
Diem crushes the Binh Xuyen sect in April. 
Period ends for French forces and their Vietnamese 
auxiliaries to deploy to the south, and Vietminh troops to 
regroup in the north. 
Diem rejects the Geneva accords and refuses to participate 
in nationwide elections on July 16, a decision backed by 
the United States. 
Ho Chi Minh, in Moscow in July, accepts aid, having earlier 
negotiated in Beijing for Chinese assistance. 
Diem defeats Bao Dai in a referendum, October 23, becomes 
chief of state; proclaims the Republic of Vietnam, with 
himself as president, October 26. 
In December, land reform in North Vietnam reaches its most 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1965 
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radical phase as landlords go before "people's tribunals." 
Prince Sihanouk, now Cambodian prime minister, asserts his 
intention in April to pursue a neutralist policy. 
In January, Soviet Union favoring a permanent division of 
the country, proposes that North and South Vietnam be 
admitted to United Nations as separate states. 
Diem arrives in U.S. for ten-day visit on May 8. President 
Eisenhower reaffirms support for his regime. 
Communist insurgent activity in South Vietnam begins in 
October in accordance with decision reached in Hanoi to 
organize thirty-seven armed companies in Mekong delta. 
During the year, guerrillas assassinated more than four 
hundred minor South Vietnamese officials. 
Communists form a coordinated command structure in eastern 
Mekong delta in June. 
Prince Souvanna Phouma dissolves his neutralist government 
in Laos on July 22; succeeded by Phoui Sananikone, who 
with American support adopts anti-Communist stance. 
A plot to overthrow Sihanouk uncovered in February, with a 
CIA agent involved. 
North Vietnam forms Group 559 in May, to begin infiltrating 
cadres and weapons into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail. 
Major Dale Buis and Sergeant Chester Ovnand killed by 
guerrillas at Bienhoa on July 8, the first Americans to die 
in what would be called the Vietnam Era. 
Diem promulgates law authorizing intense repression of 
Communist suspects and other dissidents in August. 
Hanoi leadership creates Group 959 in September to furnish 
weapons and other supplies to Communist insurgents in Laos. 
North Vietnam imposes universal military conscription in 
April. 
Eighteen prominent South Vietnamese petition Diem to reform 
his governments. 
Captain Kong Le stages coup d'etat in Laos in August, hands 
power back to Souvanna Phouma. General Phouma Noasvan, 
with CIA help, forms opposition faction in souther Laos. 
Lao Dong congress opens in Hanoi, September 5; stresses 
need to combat Diem regime. 
Johnson's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, 
arrives in Saigon on February 4, as Soviet Prime Minister 
Aleksei Kosygin arrives in Hanoi. 
Vietcong state attacks against American installations, 
February 7. 
Johnson authorizes Flaming Dart, American air raids against 
North Vietnam. 
1966 
1967 
15 
Dr. Phan Huy Quat forms governments in Saigon, February 18: 
General Khanh leaves the country. 
Operation Rolling Thunder sustained American bombing of 
North Vietnam, begins on February 24. 
Two marine battalions land to defend Danang airfield, March 
8; the first American combat troops in Vietnam. 
Johnson, at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, offers Ho 
Chi Minh participation in a Southeast Asian development 
plan in exchange for peace. 
North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Dong rejects 
Johnson's proposal, April 8; says settlement must be based 
on Vietcong program. 
Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky takes over as prime minister 
of a military regime in Saigon, June 11. 
American command in Saigon reports on June 26 that Vietcong 
have put five South Vietnamese combat regiments and nine 
battalions out of action in recent months. 
Johnson reappoints Lodge ambassador to South Vietnam, July 
8, to replace Taylor. Eighteen American combat battalions 
now in the country. 
Johnson approves Westmoreland's request, July 28, for 
forty-four additional combat battalions. 
In September, Chinese Defense Minister Lin Biao, in "Long 
Live the Victory of People's War," indicates China will not 
intervene directly in Vietnam. Mao Zedong begins the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 
American forces defeat North Vietnamese units in the 
LaDrang valley in October, the first big conventional slash 
of the war. 
By December, American troop strength in Vietnam reaches 
nearly 200,000. 
Johnson suspends bombing of North Vietnam on December 25 in 
an attempt to induce the Communists to negotiate. 
Johnson resumes bombing, January 31. 
Johnson and South Vietnamese leaders issue a communique, 
February 8, in Honolulu, emphasizing for pacification in 
South Vietnam. 
Buddhist demonstrators against Saigon regime in Hue and 
Danang, March 10. Government troops take over Danang, May 
23. Government troops take over Hue, June 16. 
American aircraft bomb oil depots near Hanoi and Haiphong, 
June 29. 
President de Gaulle of France visits Cambodia in September; 
calls for American withdrawal from Vietnam. 
American and South Vietnamese leaders conclude conference 
in Manila, October 25. 
American troop strength in Vietnam reaches nearly 400,000 
by year-end. 
North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh says on 
January 28, United States must stop bombing North Vietnam 
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before talks can begin. 
Johnson ends two-day meeting on Guam, March 21, with Thieu 
and Ky .. 
North Vietnamese reveal exchange of letters between Johnson 
and Ho Chi Minh. 
Westmoreland confers with Johnson in Washington, April 27; 
addresses Congress next day. 
Ellsworth Bunker arrives in Saigon to replace Lodge as 
ambassador, May 1. 
Kissinger begins secret talks in Paris with Le Due Tho, 
February 20. 
Sihanouk overthrown in Cambodia by Lon Nol and Sisowath 
Sirik Matak, March 18. 
Nixon announces, April 30, that American and South 
Vietnamese forces have attacked Communists sanctuaries in 
Cambodia. 
Large antiwar protests spread across the United States. 
National guardsmen kill four students at Kent State 
University in Ohio on May 4. 
Nixon proposes "standstill cease-fire," October 7, but 
repeats mutual-withdrawal formula next day. 
American combat deaths in Vietnam during last week in 
October numbered twenty-four, lowest toll since October, 
1965. 
On November 12, Lieutenant William Calley goes on trial at 
Fort Benning, Georgia, for his part in the Mylai massacre. 
American troop strength in Vietnam down to 280,000 men at 
year-end. 
In February, South Vietnamese forces begin incursions in 
Laos against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 
Lieutenant Calley convicted, March 29, of premeditated 
murder of South Vietnamese civilians at Mylai. 
Thieu reelected president of South Vietnam, October 3. 
American troop strength in Vietnam down to 140,000 in 
December. 
Nixon reveals on January 25 that Kissinger has been 
negotiating secretly with the North Vietnamese. 
North Vietnam launches offensive across the demilitarized 
zone, March 30. 
On April 15, Nixon authorizes bombing of area near Hanoi 
and Haiphong. 
North Vietnamese capture the city of Quangtri, May 1. 
On May 8, Nixon announces mining of Haiphong harbor and 
intensification of American bombing of North Vietnam. 
Thieu opposes draft agreement in meeting with Kissinger's 
assistant, Alexander Haigh, October 4. 
Breakthrough at Paris meeting between Kissinger and Le Due 
Tho, October 8. Back in Saigon in mid-October, Kissinger 
finds Thieu implacably opposed to agreement. 
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Hanoi radio broadcasts details of the agreement in an 
effort to pressure Kissinger. But he is anxious to 
reassure North Vietnam; declares that "peace is at hand." 
Kissinger resumes talks with Le Due Tho, November 20, 
presents him with sixty-nine amendments to agreement 
demanded by Thieu. 
Fresh talks between Kissinger and Le Due Tho begin again in 
December and break down. 
On December 18, Nixon orders bombing of areas around Hanoi 
and Haiphong, raids continue to eleven days. Communists 
agree to resume diplomatic talks when bombing stops. 
Kissinger and Le Due Tho resume talks, January 8, finally 
initial agreement, January 23. 
Cease fire agreements formally signed in Paris, January 27. 
Secretary of Defense Laird announces that draft in the 
United States has ended. 
Last American troops leave Vietnam, March 29. 
Last American prisoners of war released in Hanoi, April 1. 
Thieu declares in January that the war has begun again. 
Communist buildup of men and supplies proceeds in South 
Vietnam in June. 
Communists capture Phuoc Long province, north of Saigon, 
January 6. 
North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung goes south to take 
command of Communist forces, February 5. 
Communist capture Banmethuot, March 11. 
Thieu meets with his commanders at Camranh, March 15; 
orders northern provinces of South Vietnam abandoned. 
Thieu reserves himself, orders Hue held at all costs, March 
20. But the city falls to the Communists five days later. 
Communists capture Danang, March 30. 
On March 31, politburo in Hanoi directs General Dung to 
push toward Saigon in the "Ho Chi Minh Campaign." 
Le Due Tho arrives at Communist headquarters at Locninh, 
April 7, to oversee offensive. 
In Cambodia, Phnompenh falls to the Khmer Rouge, April 17. 
Communists capture Xuan Loe, April 21, last South 
Vietnamese defense line before Saigon. 
President Ford, speaking in New Orleans on April 23, calls 
the war "finished." 
Thieu leaves Saigon for Taiwan, April 25. Vice-President 
Tran Van Huong transfers authority as chief of state to 
General Duong Van Minh, April 28. 
Option IV, evacuation of last Americans from Saigon, begins 
April 29. Ambassador Martin departs. 
Communist forces capture Saigon, April 30. Colonel Bui Tin 
takes surrender from Minh. 
U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez seized by Cambodian Communists 
in Gulf of Siam, May 12. American aircraft bomb Cambodia. 
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Thirty-eight U.S. marines die in rescue of thirty-nine 
seamen. 
On January 21, the day after his inauguration, Carter 
pardons most of 10,000 Vietnam war draft evaders. 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke begins talks 
with Vietnamese officials in March to explore U.S. 
recognition of Vietnam. 
Vietnam joins Comecon, the East European economic 
community, in June. 
In July, tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia build up; 
relations between Vietnam and China deteriorate. 
In October, United States postpones plans to normalize 
relations with Vietnam. 
In November, Vietnam and Soviet Union sign a friendship 
pact, which the Chinese term a "threat to the security" of 
southeast Asia. 
Vietnam starts to repress its ethnic Chinese minority. 
Thousands flee the country. 
Vietnam invades Cambodia, December 25. 
Thousands of "boat people" begin to flee Vietnam in 
December. 
China invades Vietnam in February. 2 
Vietnam veterans memorial unveiled in Washington, D.C., 
November 11. 3 
Vietnam veterans march in Chicago, June 13. 4 
Why such an emphasis on Tet? The crucial decisiveness of these 
unexpected battles, unexpected in Vietnam and by the public in the 
United States led to a psychological defeat in the face of a genuine 
military victory. And there has been unending controversy ever since. 
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CHAPTER III 
HOW REPORTAGE SHAPED PERCEPTION 
Indeed, they were the "Reporters of the Lost War." 
Thomas R. Morgan told of their heroic efforts in an article for 
the July, 1984 issue of the Esguire magazine. Morgan reported what they 
did and their influence: "For most Americans, the war was media. The 
news we saw, heard and read in our living room defined it and gave it a 
certain dimension. 111 
Morgan interviewed ten well-known journalists who covered 
Vietnam, Interviewed were Ward Just, David Halberstam, Michael Herr, 
Peter Arnett, Tim Page, Charles Mohr, John Laurence, Neil Sheehan, 
Gloria Emerson and H. D. S. Greenway. Morgan goes on to show the ten 
are highly regarded, won awards and served in Vietnam ranging from at 
least eleven months to more than ten years at various times in a space 
of fifteen years or so. 
Just's experiences were summarized in these words: 
"What the war did," he said, 
was really make me a profound pessimist. I have never seen a 
collection of men work harder than the Americans in Vietnam. I'm 
talking specifically about my time there. The war overwhelmed 
everyone. In the American embassy, the twelve-to-fourteen-hour day 
was absolutely routine. Love affairs took place in the context of 
the war. Evenings of drinking took place in the context of the war. 
You could go days, literally, without having a conversation that had 
anything to do with anything other than the war. You were caught up 
in that funny kind of way you are in the opening moments of a love 
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affair. And for many people, this had been going on for years--it 
was their entire life. 
And then add this: 
"The thing that Vietnam did, of course," he said, 
was spoil you for anything else. It didn't seem to me that being a 
political writer had the same stakes that the war did. The war 
really mattered, getting things right about the war mattered, 
spending time with the troops and trying to find out truly what was 
going on mattered in a way that dreaming up editorials didn't. I 
did not want to go cover another war, either. I'd done that. So I 
was ruined as a journalist after Vietnam. There was too much that 
could not be explained. After what you'd seen, the only way you 
could write about it was to go very deep into the imagination and 
write about it in a fictional mode. I might add that Vietnam was 
not a popular subject and writing about it is no way to fame, power, 
and riches. 
Any analysis of reporting of events immediately before, during, 
and after Tet must first acknowledge what must first be present to make 
news. 
Stephens and Lanson in their text, Writin& & Reportin&, list 
several generally accepted news determinants. Included are: impact, 
controversy, weight, emotion, uniqueness, prominence, timeliness, 
currency, educational value. 2 
War is controversy. War certainly is conflict and therefore 
news. Often, big and continuing news. It is neither partisan or 
simplistic to offer that all the news media play a substantial and 
important role in affecting the American public as well as many of those 
in the free world. 
Patterson and McClure had this to say in The Unseein& Eye: 
To control what people see and hear means to control the public's 
view of political reality. By covering certain news events, by 
simply giving them space, the media signals the importance of these 
events to the citizenry. By not reporting other activities, the 
media hides portion of reality from everyone but the few people 
directly affected .... Events and problems placed on the national 
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agenda by the media excite public interest and become objects of 
government action. 3 
This conclusion by Patterson and McClure implies a conspiracy by 
news executives to "place" news before the public. This does not happen 
and did happen in the Tet coverage. The enormous competition alone in 
the news industry eliminates the often mentioned "conspiracy" theory. 
The author disagrees, too, with the observation by Patterson and 
McClure that "the media hides portions of reality from everyone but the 
few people directly affected. " Professional journalists who seek 
to "hide" news will not survive long in a highly competitive situation. 
And the Tet offensive was a competitive event for reporters. 
Tet had many correspondents. It is likely that few were more 
competent, or braver, than a reporter for the New York Times. He was 
Charles Mohr. Mohr and two other journalists were awarded Bronze Stars 
in 1980 by the then commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. 
The three were the only civilians so honored by the marines for 
heroism during the Vietnam War. Their Bronze Stars were for attempting 
under fire to rescue a dying marine. Mohr was not wounded, but 
correspondents Alvin Webb of UPI and David Greenway of Time were hit by 
gunfire or shells. 
Their uncommon bravery was documented in Battle for Hue by Keith 
William Nolan. 4 
Mohr offered his reflection on Hue, Tet and Vietnam in a far 
ranging interview with aforementioned writer Morgan. 5 
. And the Marine that Dave Greenway, Al Webb and I saved at Hue 
had been shot in the throat and died anyway. That affected me most 
profoundly in the intensity and degree of contempt built up in me 
for civilian policy makers [who put] troops in hazard for concepts 
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like credibility and essentiality, which boils down to the 
unwillingness to admit a mistake and disengage. 
Writer Morgan asked Mohr if Vietnam had bothered his sleep. 
"I have never had nightmares because of Vietnam," he said. 
It made me see what war is though. Peter Arnett and some other 
reporters and I were together one night during some fighting and we 
were able to sleep in the medical bunker on the operating cots. 
Well, four or five times during the night we had to get up as they 
brought casualties in. I remember one kid who had been in the 
National Football League draft was brought in with his legs all 
blown to hell and he wanted to hold my hand and all that stuff. 6 
Mohr did some sober reflecting on what he and other journalists 
did in Vietnam and presented the results in an article "Once Again--Did 
the Press Lose Vietnam?" A sub-headline read "A veteran correspondent 
takes on the new revisionists." The article is authoritative in that 
Mohr spent four years as a battle correspondent in Vietnam from 1962 
through 1973. Mohr was in Saigon when the Tet offensive began as was 
Peter Braestrup. 
Mohr then was an on-the-scene observer at Tet who rebuts what he 
describes as "the surly critiques of the polemicists." And Mohr 
identified some of those he claimed were guilty of historical 
revisionism with this: 
Notable among the critics, writing and speaking with varying degrees 
of bitterness and coherence, have been the editorial page of The 
Wall Street Journal, Robert S. Elegant, (a former Los Angeles Times 
reporter), William F. Buckley, John P. Roche, Walt W. Rostow, 
William C. Westmoreland, Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger. 7 
Mohr contends, simply and directly, that the revisionists, and 
he has named only a few, simply do not know much about what it is that 
they are talking and writing about. 
Some of these critics have drawn conclusions that bear little 
relation to the actual conduct of mainstream journalists for major 
news organizations in the years 1961 to 1975. Some of their 
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conclusions also reflect an astonishing misrepresentation, or at 
least misunderstanding of the nature of war. This can be especially 
disturbing when it comes from former civilian officials who helped 
manage and prosecute the war. There is also confusion about the 
manner in which events actually unfolded, the problems of Vietnam 
war correspondence, and what the journalists actually said and 
wrote. 8 
Mohr's attack against the revisionists must be understood in the 
context and against the backdrop of very frequent criticism of Vietnam 
war correspondents. 
It was common knowledge among journalists here in the United 
States during the early 1960s that President John F. Kennedy was quite 
unhappy over the Vietnam coverage and sought to have David Halberstam of 
the New York Times returned home. 
There was continuing tension over the independent reporting by 
professional journalists in Vietnam. And it continued until the U.S. 
withdrawal from Saigon. The assault on the journalists by revisionists 
has not ceased, either, since Mohr's 1984 article. Mistakes were made, 
of course, by journalists. Mohr has this summary of the overall 
performance by journalists and their shaping of perceptions. 
Before and after Tet, the story did often tend to overwhelm the 
essentially conventional journalistic methods we employed. Much 
went unreported, although this may have been unavoidable in a 
sprawling nation of forty-four provinces and scores of allied 
divisions and brigades. 
Granted that much went unreported, that factual errors were not 
rare, that sometimes were too argumentative and skeptical (although 
much of the time we were far too gullible), that we spent too much 
time covering American troops and too little with the South 
Vietnamese. Still, in a broad sense, the coverage seems sound in 
retrospect. Not only ultimately, but also at each major milestone 
of the war, the weight of serious reporting corresponds quite 
closely to the historical record. 
Revisionists seem to fault correspondents for distrusting the 
version of events propounded by the most optimistic senior officials 
in Vietnam. But what if the correspondents had believed the version 
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and been guided by it in carrying out their assignment? In that 
case, the reporters' reputations, which are not unblemished, would 
be irredeemably tarnished. 9 
The reputations of Mohr and other Vietnam correspondents have 
not, to my knowledge, been "irredeemably tarnished" by the revisionists 
or anyone else. There is rather an almost universal failing abroad in 
this land to either understand, or struggle to understand, what it is 
journalists do or why they do it. 
Two colleagues of Charles Mohr--David Halberstam, then of the 
New York Times and Malcolm Browne of the Associated Press--were awarded 
the Pulitzer Prize in 1964. 
Halberstam, a graduate of Harvard College, was no favorite of 
his fellow Harvard alumnus--John F. Kennedy--due to his honest accurate 
and hard-hitting reporting. And he pulled no punches in telling Morgan 
later of what it meant to be an honest reporter in Vietnam. 
The truth, and it remains for me all these years still a painful 
truth, is that we in the media erred not in being too pessimistic, 
but in not being pessimistic enough .... We never managed to get 
into our stories what the French Indochina war had done to Vietnam, 
how it had created in the North a modern dynamic society and how it 
had given us as allies a dying postfeudal order .... [Our sins 
were] not that we were inadequately patriotic or that we undermined 
an otherwise high national purpose--but rather that we did not from 
the start make clear the impossibility of the struggle. That is 
burden enough for most of us to bear these twenty years. 10 
Without question, Halberstam ranks very high in any rating of 
hero correspondents in Vietnam. And he was among the first, if not the 
first. His cohorts included Homer Bigart of the New York Times, and 
Mert Perry who were not interviewed by Morgan. 
Halberstam was a recent Harvard graduate. That assured at least 
a modicum of competence and talent. 
Halberstam, later the author of several books, once correctly 
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wrote: "Vietnam was a war in which journalists made their reputations 
and generals lost theirs." So it was. And those generals and other 
military officials still have not forgiven journalists. 
In fifteen months of superb reporting, Halberstam established a 
permanent reputation as a first class reporter and writer. 
Any consideration of Halberstam must include an appraisal of the 
work of combat correspondent Homer Bigart. Nieman Fellow Jack Foisie 
'47 this remembrance of Bigart for the Fall, 1991 issue of the Nieman 
Reports: 11 
He was the longest-serving copy boy ever to put in time on The 
New York Herald Tribune. His editors were slow to learn that behind 
his intense stuttering was a stubborn talent. 
As a Stars and Stripes reporter I remember taking Homer out in 
Sicily on his first look at ground combat. Until then he had been 
based in London, one of the first correspondents to fly bombing 
missions. 
I took him to the Third Division HQ where he was briefed, then 
to regiment, then to battalion. "That's about it, Mr. Bigart," I 
said. "We can go up to an OP and you can see some fighting. " But 
oh no, the newcomer insisted on going forward to a company. Then he 
made a bent-over dash to a platoon outpost. Where he and his 
reluctant guide took a bout of German mortar fire. This guy isn't 
going to last long, I decided. 
His cabled report to the Herald-Trib that day skipped any 
personalization. But the home front readers gained a good idea of 
what combat is all about. 
The rest is legion. When The Herald Tribune folded, The New 
York Times grabbed him. 
It took me some time before I realized Homer also had acting 
talent. When the press camp was about to move, Homer always seemed 
bewildered. I or other colleagues always found ourselves doing his 
packing, rolling up his sleeping bag. While Homer pecked out 
another dispatch! 
It was the same ambling Bigart in Korea. Our paths did not 
cross there. But they did again in the early days in Vietnam. What 
a remarkable man. Although they will be Nieman citations, perhaps 
your idea of recognizing journalistic excellence could be called 
Bigart Awards. 
The Bigart reputation than cast a heavy shadow of independence 
and integrity upon the younger Halberstam and others. And Halberstam, 
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although only twenty-eight, responded brilliantly to the challenge in 
his Vietnam assignment. And praise came quickly. He earned a Pulitzer 
Prize and several other awards. 
Commentarv magazine described Halberstam as the "Times most 
exceptional reporter of recent years." Harper's said: " ... at the age 
of 35 . a legend in American journalism. 
Tom Morgan accurately focus on Halberstam as the "Woodward and 
Bernstein of Vietnam." It is even fairer to say that Woodward and 
Bernstein are the David Halberstam of Vietnam. 
He is still the first correspondent I think of when I remember 
Vietnam's adversarial journalism .... He blew the whistle the 
loudest, if not quite first or more clearly, following his idol, 
Homer Bigart, who had left prophesizing that the war wasn't to be 
won. After he left it took several years before other 
correspondents concluded that the war wouldn't be won, and several 
years more before any felt, that, under the circumstance, it 
shouldn't be won. 12 
The late, great Ernie Pyle, of course, had no direct and 
specific influence on the Vietnam War. His shadow of heroism and 
professionalism did hover over Bigart, Foisie, Halberstam and many 
others. 
Controversy has swirled about reporter Halberstam and his role 
in the war. Controversy over Vietnam has dogged Halberstam and will 
continue to do so. It is clear, however, that the professionalism and 
courage of Halberstam did make a difference. History will only polish 
those Halberstam qualities, not diminish them. 
Unlike their friend Mohr, neither Halberstam or the estimable 
Neil Sheehan covered Tet. But Sheehan since his Vietnam days in the 
early 1960s has emerged as one of this century's premier American 
journalists. 
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Writer Torn Morgan in his aforementioned Esquire piece wrote of 
Sheehan: 
Inspired by his friend (Horner) Bigart, Sheehan along with Halberstam 
and Browne helped discover his own country's awesome "credibility 
gap" in Vietnam. In turn, that discovery brought him to another: 
that he would have to make his choice--not only as a journalist but 
also as an Arnerican--between politics and truth. Vietnam insisted 
that Sheehan define himself as a public man and as a private 
citizen. 13 
Sheehan, a Harvard College graduate as Halberstam, first went to 
Vietnam for the United Press International and was later hired by the 
New York Times. Some of what Sheehan, a U.S. Army veteran before 
Vietnam, told writer Morgan is of considerable significance in light of 
later developments. His words are most meaningful, in my opinion, in 
seeking to evaluate, understand and assess and evaluate how reporters 
shape perception. 
In part Sheehan commented: 
I went there as a young man with all the ideas of the Cold War and 
American imperialism in my head, believing in all that. I was very 
much in favor of our being in Vietnam. I think we all were in 1962 
and 1963. And we ran into a situation where no official spokesman 
on the American side would tell you anything. It was a splendid 
mistake the Kennedy administration made. They thought they would 
reduce reporting in Vietnam if the official spokesman provided no 
information. Instead, they forced all of us to develop a whole 
network of sources among the South Vietnamese military and the 
American advisers, sources of our own. We had to get the 
information ourselves. Nobody was going to give it to us. It 
wasn't going to be announced. And this gave us--at first it was 
terribly difficult--enormous independence, because we were not 
dependent upon the press spokesman. 14 
Sheehan did not hold back in telling writer Morgan in detail 
what he did and why he did it. He and most of his colleagues reported 
the pessimistic as well as the official of events. They wanted an 
American victory, but not at the cost of the truth. They always sought 
to tell it like it was. 
29 
This was not always easily accepted. A very testy Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk once asked correspondents: 
"Whose side are you on?" 
Rusk did not get Sheehan's answers directly, but Morgan did: 
We felt we ought to try to convey the truth so that we could start 
winning the war. We felt that the senior officers who didn't have a 
grasp of reality were in effect assisting the opposition, assisting 
the Vietnamese Communists, because they were carrying out a self-
defeating policy, and, as Americans, we wanted to see the United 
States win there. We felt we were being patriotic. But then, as 
the years went by, this slowly changed from an emotional desire to 
help win the war to simply a struggle to get out the truth. 15 
Sheehan spent from 1962 to 1966 covering the war for the UPI and 
then the New York Times. 
"What those Vietnam years did for me," Sheehan told Morgan, 
was to confirm that I was professional witness, that my value lay in 
what I could report of a situation looking at it independently, and 
trying to find out and record and report what actually happened 
versus what we would like to happen, or what people with vested 
interests said had happened. Vietnam made me grow up as a 
journalist. 16 
Sheehan took that maturity from Vietnam here to the United 
States for a series of assignments from the New York Times from 1966 to 
1971. He first was at the Pentagon, then covered the White House and 
then served as an investigative reporter for the Times' Washington 
bureau. 
A friend named Daniel Ellsberg read a Sheehan piece in which he 
asked whether war crimes had actually been committed in Vietnam by 
American leaders. 
Although it became public later, Ellsberg made available a 47-
volume very secret report that eventually became known as the Pentagon 
Papers. Of course, it set off a wild battle between the Times and the 
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U.S. government and involved the issue of a battle over prior straint 
that had to be settled in a special session by the United States Supreme 
Court. The Times won and most of their stories about the Pentagon 
Papers were written by Sheehan. 
In recent years Sheehan has written a biography of the late Lt. 
Col. John Paul Vann, who was both a hero and victim of the Vietnam war. 
Vann was in Vietnam for nearly ten years as both a career soldier and as 
a civilian official. He was killed in early June, 1972 in a helicopter 
crash in Vietnam. Of his Vann book, published sometime in late 1988, 
Sheehan told Morgan: 
I felt I wanted to leave something behind more permanent than 
another magazine article. So I thought I'd try to bring to history 
and biography the qualities of the journalist: the ability to 
reconstruct in detail something that has happened. 17 
Four chapters of the Vann book were published in The New Yorker 
during the summer of 1988. Sheehan set about in the 1980s in Washington 
to do what he said he had done in the 1960s: "Serve the general 
interest." "In Vietnam," Sheehan told Morgan, 
you served the general interest by providing information that helped 
society to work its way through what turned out to be a long, 
profound national crisis, which changed much of our thinking about 
our role in the world, our fallibility versus our infallibility, our 
right to kill in the name of American ideas. That is, we went into 
Vietnam with the belief that we had the right to kill any Vietnamese 
or get them killed, or any Korean, or any Chinese, because what we 
were doing was going to save humanity. Well, then Vietnam made me, 
at least, realize that we didn't have a monopoly on good. We could 
do evil just like other people. If I succeed in writing a book that 
helps us understand that experience better than we have so far, well 
that would be a great emotional fulfillment for me. It would give 
meaning to my life. 18 
Any consideration of reporting (and reporters) must consider the 
beginning of the Tet offensive in downtown Saigon. Again, Charles Mohr 
of The New York Times was at center-point. Also, much present was Peter 
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Braestrup, then the chief of the Washin~ton Post's Saigon bureau. Mohr 
was quick in his article published in the Columbia Journalism Review to 
defend the reporting of the Communist invasion of the U.S. Embassy 
grounds. 
The most serious charge made by the revisionists, and one of the 
most frequently repeated, is that the Vietnam press corps failed to 
report an allied victory at Tet and, indeed, concealed its 
existence. There were unquestionably, flaws in the purely military 
coverage and not all of them were sins of omission. But in its raw 
form the charge does not seem to hold up. 19 
Mohr was steadfast in his opposition to the revisionists with 
this: 
I believe that Tet represented a serious tactical defeat for the 
Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese superiors. But this did not 
ultimately constitute a strategic victory for South Vietnam. That 
should be obvious. It was also argued that Tet shattered, nearly 
destroyed, the indigenous guerrillas and forced North Vietnam to 
continue the war with its own regular army troops. This was also to 
a large extent true; but it was also what almost all serious 
journalists reported. 20 
Gloria Emerson is certainly not to be overlooked;~ any study of 
Vietnam correspondents. 
Emerson's philosophy was apparent in this comment to Morgan: 
"I didn't have any idea what the war would mean to me. All I ever 
wanted to do in my whole life was work for the New York Times. It was 
the kingdom. I never wanted to do anything else. 1121 
And there was this comment to Morgan about Vietnam and World War 
II reporting: 
In Vietnam, the reporters were on the wrong side. That created a 
certain mental strain, a peculiar anguish that could not have been 
known by correspondents in World War II. And then, to come back 
home and find no one held accountable for the ruin of a small 
country and see our veterans was to know a despair that was 
inconceivable as a younger woman. 
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Emerson was asked by Morgan what her lasting impressions of 
Vietnam were. The answer: 
. I have become someone else. Certainly harsher, certainly 
crueler. I find that instead of being more gentle and more 
sympathetic, I am harsher and I am crueler. That's--well, you 
wanted to know what effect the war had. But maybe I would have been 
this way anyway. 
The last interview for Tom Morgan was with H. D. S. (David) 
Greenway. Here was the proper Bostonian with a Yale, Oxford and U.S. 
Navy background who spent the better part of the years 1967 to 1975 in 
Indochina. He also spent time at Harvard as a Nieman Fellow. And 
became an associate editor at the Boston Globe. 
Greenway stands tall as one of America's premier correspondents 
in the Vietnam war. Greenway was wounded at Hue when he and Charlie 
Mohr and Alvin Webb, UPI, risked their lives to rescue a severely 
wounded Marine. Greenway was wounded in the leg and returned to duty 
the next week and on crutches was sending his dispatches from Saigon. 
Greenway told Tom Morgan: 
I covered Vietnam for Time from Saigon in 1967 and 1968, and then 
from Bangkok, running the bureau that had responsibility for Laos 
and Cambodia. I was in Laos in March of 1970 for the coup against 
Sihanouk, and in the spring of 1972 for the North Vietnamese 
invasion. I then joined the Washin&ton Post and they sent me right 
back to Saigon. I kept going back and back. I was there in 1973, 
the time of "peace at hand" the peace that never really was a peace, 
then months after that in Cambodia with the war getting worse and 
worse. In the spring of 1975 I went from Cambodia back to Vietnam 
for the collapse of Saigon, and then I finally left by helicopter 
from a rooftop in the command of the American embassy on April 29, 
1975. 22 
And there was this quote from Greenway to Morgan: 
There wasn't any need for me to rush back and back, except for the 
terrible attraction that Indonesia had, and except there wasn't any 
place as interesting. And even today, nothing life has ever reached 
that intensity. If I'm lucky, it never will again. 
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In 1980, Greenway, Mohr and the UPI's Webb all were awarded 
Bronze Stars by the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. They were the 
only civilians so honored by the Marines during the Vietnam War. Nolan 
in "Battle for Hue" graphically details the heroics of the three 
newsmen. It should be remembered they were noncombatants, civilians, 
who risked their lives to rescue a dying fellow American--a young U.S. 
Marine. Tragically, the Marine dies later despite their efforts. 
Photographer Tim Page found early that combat was not safe for 
photographers. Robert Capa died. And later Page's buddies Larry 
Burrows and Sean Flynn perished. But Page survived. 
Page was grievously wounded by a land mine, but managed to 
survive. 
Tom Morgan asked what had been driving Page in Vietnam. The 
answer: 
You are either curious and intrigued about what's happening in a 
place or not. You've got to keep playing with finding out, or not. 
If you want to do that, Vietnam was sure as hell exciting. It was a 
rock 'n' roll time. I had some of the best cope, the best women I 
ever had. It was karma. The Sixties, mate were the most important 
decade, sex and drugs and rock 'n' roll. And 1968, that was the 
most important year of all. The Doors, the Airplane--you have to 
remember the music. I loved it. It was the fastest, most exciting 
time I'll ever see. I don't regret a minute of it, although it 
would have been nice to have had a little less pain. 23 
Charles Mohr is now dead. His spirit, however, should be alive 
for a long time in writers covering wars--anywhere and any place. Mohr 
came out of Nebraska and graduated from the state university there. His 
career as a war correspondent spanned more than thirty years. 
Professional journalists generally agreed that covering wars and related 
military affairs brings out the best of journalistic talents. Indeed, 
Mohr was all of that for Time and the New York Times. He was eclectic. 
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He served as a competent White House correspondent, covered political 
campaigns nationwide, and wrote well on a variety of military technology 
subjects. 
The place of Michael Herr in Vietnam War history is secure for 
now and forever. The author of Dispatches will be always remembered for 
his audacious reporting and observations. 
He once said, 
I went there behind the crude but serious belief that you had to be 
able to look at anything, serious because I acted on it and went, 
crude because I didn't know, it took the war to teach it, that you 
were as responsible for everything you saw as you were for 
everything you did. 24 
Herr covering future wars? 
"Any more wars? 
Vietnam is the 
up the obsession. 
every time there's 
a magazine to go. 
to, man. 
Never again, man," he says. 25 
central issue of my generation. We never cleaned 
But I'll never go to another war. Shit, man, 
a shot fired around the world, I get a call from 
I won't want to see it ever again. I don't want 
Herr's reactions should answer those who would dramatize death 
in battle as something greatly heroic and to be desired. Herr's remarks 
reminds one of the actions by General Lucien K. Truscott, the crusty 
World War II combat leader who returned to the Anzio beachhead on 
Memorial Day, 1945. Truscott was one of several speakers, but he spoke 
to the dead, not the living. 
Truscott emotionally faced the lines of crosses and Stars of 
David. He apologized to his fallen comrades and warned that old men 
should remember there was nothing dramatic or to be desired about death 
in combat. Among the witnesses at that dramatic scene was Bill Mauldin, 
Truscott's friend and a Pulitzer Prize winning cartoonist. 
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Peter Arnett is another esteemed correspondent who witnessed, 
and survived, the Vietnam conflict. Arnett's considerable skills have 
since earned his recognition for his work for CNN during the Gulf War. 
Arnett's peers, according to Tom Morgan, argue that Arnett 
should have received more than a Pulitzer Prize. Arnett was then 
praised by his peers for "accurate observation, unflagging curiosity, 
and competitive zeal." 
Those same peers also declared that Arnett's personal research 
and military savvy developed to heroic proportions during Vietnam 
combat. Younger reporters were told to risk their lives for a story 
overnight in a Vietnam village "only if Arnett is there." 
John Laurence of CBS News was a good friend and colleague of 
Charles Mohr. Laurence was a college dropout who went from the U.S. to 
Vietnam for the first time in 1965 and spent many years there. 
He told Morgan in most poignant terms what the war meant to him: 
The Vietnam experience--to see all that waste of life--was 
deeply disturbing. Very, very few journalists or soldiers who saw 
combat were not affected by it. War is a shattering, abhorrent form 
of human behavior, brutal beyond imagination. It was a long war, 
and if it changed me it is that having been rational and fairly 
level-headed, having practiced my profession in a good way, and 
behaved humanely through it, all that has given me a certain 
confidence in dealing with ordinary life and ordinary situations. 
"War," he continued, 
teaches you a lot about other people and about yourself. These very 
violent situations, shared with other men and women who do or do not 
react gracefully, tend to create an extraordinary history for a 
friendship. Many of my closest friends today are reporters and 
photographers I went through the war with. We had a shared spirit 
of excitement in combat. That cannot be denied. The British said 
we were war junkies and war lovers and had a death wish. But I feel 
we were just the opposite. Meticulous planning, careful briefing, 
and caution kept us alive. One was not a war-lover. The war wasn't 
"fun. " 26 
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The following basic questions were asked of ten journalists 
interviewed for this-dissertation: 
1. Was the news coverage of the Tet military action reliable 
to be used by future teachers, students, and historians? 
not, why not? 
enough 
If 
2. Was there accurate coverage during Tet of President Johnson and 
his administration in Washington, D.C. and in Vietnam? If not, 
why not? 
3. What mistakes were made during Tet by the news media in Vietnam 
and Washington? 
4. Was Peter Braestrup accurate in his accusations of President 
Johnson's alleged "willy nilly" conduct before and during Tet? 
5. Are the available radio, TV tapes and news accounts, periodicals 
and books on Tet accurate enough for use today by students, 
teachers and scholars? If not, why not? 
Those interviewed all were reporters or observers in Vietnam. 
Their answers to the attached key questions were offered without bias 
and the spirit of neutrality. 
First interviewed was Larry Green, then Midwest bureau chief of 
the Los An&eles Times. He was assigned to Vietnam as a correspondent 
for the old Chicago Daily News in the 1960s and 1970s. Interviewed June 
22, 1986. 
His answers: 
1. The coverage was reliable as any information that is quickly 
gathered. We were doing history in a hurry. After the 
fact, you can fill in the blanks and make adjustments. 
There was simultaneous turmoil in every major battle and 
development. 
2. No. That administration (Johnson] was not leveling with us. 
The news from reporters was a lot more accurate. What was 
written and reported was the kind of stuff that the first 
Amendment was created for. The press was way ahead in 
telling the truth and perceiving what happened. The new 
media was sharper. 
3. Some coverage suggested that the Communist offensive as 
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being more successful than it actually was. Communists were 
losing the battle, but laying the groundwork to win the war. 
The events we were covering were happening in multiple 
confusion and under very primitive circumstances. There 
were more battles going on over there than journalists could 
cover. And the military were not informing us. 
4. Am not able to answer. 
5. The news media is the best we've got. Reporters and 
photographers did tend to stick together as we did at the 
Embassy during Tet. 
Jack Fuller now is editor of the Chica&o Tribune. He earned a 
Pulitzer Prize for his editorials on the Constitution. Jack is a 
graduate of Yale Law School and was reported for the old Chica&o Daily 
News. He has written a novel from his Vietnam experience. Interviewed 
July 20, 1986. 
His answers: 
I 
1. One has to be very careful to rely on the Tet coverage. 
There were any number of misstatements. I don't believe 
that everything we have now is absolutely correct. At the 
same time, it can be said there were some accounts that were 
absolutely accurate. I will cite the work of Bernard 
Weintraub of the New York Times and Charles Mohr, now also 
with the Times. 
2. I don't have enough information to think to answer this 
question. 
3. The primary mistake was that we did not report Tet as a 
tactical disaster for the North Vietnam. We didn't realize 
the infrastructure was destroyed in the villages. The 
misimpression at the time was that Tet was a strategic 
victory for the enemy. 
4. There were problems before and after Tet as far as the 
administration was concerned. The government was unwilling 
to level with the people. 
5. They are accurate for use today if you are skeptical. 
Keyes Beach accurately can be described as an "old hand" in the 
Far East. He logged nearly forty years out there as a U.S. Marine and a 
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very successful correspondent for the old Chica~o Daily News. He 
observed World War II, Korea and Vietnam. He is generally rated as one 
of the premier war correspondents (U.S.) of this century. He was 
interviewed July 7, 1986, by telephone at his retirement home near 
Washington, D.C. Keyes Beech has since died. 
1. No. It's not sensationalism. There were some instances of 
sensational coverage. It depends on why you read. Breaking 
into our Embassy was done. The enemy politically won Tet, 
but not militarily. 
2. I'm not competent to answer. 
3. South Vietnamese committed atrocities. However, we did not 
photograph or play the atrocities committed by our enemies. 
They were seldom reported. What the enemy did as far as 
atrocities was hardly news. Yes, My Lai was terrible, but 
what the North Vietnamese did at Hue was kill 3,000 persons. 
Executed. I've been around a lot of wars, but those 
executions got little play. 
4. Yes. I have faith in Peter Braestrup's credibility. And he 
was a company commander with the U.S. Marines in Korea. 
5. I was very much impressed by the 13-part PBS series on 
Vietnam. I give Stanley Karnow a lot of credit for that 
series. Really, I've stayed from a lot of the other 
accounts and stories since I've returned. 
Haynes Johnson, now a Washin~ton Post columnist, is a regular 
and popular panelist on the PBS "Washington Review" TV show on Friday 
nights. He is the author of about ten boo~s. He has been close to the 
Washington scene for many years. His father was a newsman. He was 
interviewed by telephone on July 7, 1986. 
1. News of any event is really not definitive. We do not know 
why. 
2. No. There were lots of reasons. There sometimes was not 
credence to our second-guessing. We were not plugging into 
reality. There was a lot of covering that we did not do. 
3. There were multiple mistakes. And there were many 
misunderstandings. There was a misunderstanding of the 
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roots of historical forces at work. There was an awful lot 
of "Bang-Bang" journalism also involved. 
4. Essentially yes. Peter Braestrup might have made too hard a 
case at times. 
5. I think you have to be careful in using and defining 
accurate. What we have available, of course, are valuable 
tools. All sides are useful to be seen. History then is 
not black and white. 
David Reed was a senior roving editor of the Reader's Di~est 
magazine. He was interviewed by telephone July 11, 1986 from his home 
in Annapolis, MD. Reed had several tours in Vietnam and wrote a book 
and several articles on his experiences. He tended to be caustic and 
direct in any conversation, particularly one involving his profession 
and colleagues. He is now dead. 
1. It was a military disaster, but political victory. You have 
to remember that the American public despite the 
developments really want out. TV infrastructure was left 
intact despite the battles. 
2. The correspondents largely were inexperienced. They 
embarrassed the government. I am especially remembering 
David Halberstam and Merton Perry. Mal Brown of the AP was 
experienced and did a good job. There were some accurate 
accounts and some were not. 
3. The mistake I remember now is that journalists failed to 
realize there was a military disaster over there. 
4. I have a graduated response. There was some managing of the 
news there. I did not feel then, and do not now, that we were 
brainwashed. 
5. The TV clips can be of some use. But you often have tanks 
going round and round for a minute and that's it. I think 
TV is out to sensationalize and in doing so makes the print 
guys look bad. A lot of the people over there as 
journalists were only 22-23 years old and did not have much 
status. The photographers often shot and sent back whatever 
they had. I was there for a monthly magazine, so my 
operating standards differed greatly from many others. 
Bill Plante is now a correspondent for "CBS TV News". He had 
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four separate tours of duty in Vietnam from 1964 to 1975. He is low-
key, direct and concise. Bill is a 1959 graduate of Loyola University 
of Chicago. He was interviewed July 11, 1986. 
1. Yes. It was what we knew at the time. We were limited by 
the amount of time that was available to us. The military 
action was a surprise and created temporary chaos. 
2. My impression is that we were given a heavy dose of self-
serving bull-shit by Johnson and his people. We were 
ambushed at Credibility Gap. 
3. We had little documentation for what the North Vietnamese 
did. I guess we saw their faults far less than we should 
have. 
4. President Johnson did unpredictable things. He got away 
with arm-twisting on the national level, but it would not 
work on the international level. And he did not like this. 
5. I have not found much to fault. I don't feel qualified to 
say much more on this question. 
Raymond R. Coffey is now a columnist and editorial page editor 
of the Chica&o Sun Times. He is a graduate in journalism from Marquette 
University. He served three tours in Vietnam as a correspondent for the 
Chica&o Daily News. He also served many years as the chief Washington 
correspondent for the Chica&o Tribune. He was interviewed July 14, 
1986. 
1. I think so. The stuff that came out definitely should be 
historically useful. 
2. Yes in Vietnam. Westmoreland was given a fair shake. The 
psychological victory was important over the military 
victory. It was Westmoreland and Johnson who said this was 
not a great victory for the VC. 
3. There were mechanical mistakes that are made on any big, 
breaking story--even the Our Lady of Angels School fire. 
There are initial judgments that later prove wrong. The 
wire services make mistakes under pressure. It is 
unrealistic to not expect mistakes in the first four to 
twelve hours. You are going to have them. 
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4. Johnson and Westmoreland were the principal contributors to 
the "win" psychology. These two also blew us smoke over the 
"light at- the end of the tunnel" stuff. The original shock 
of Tet came out of what Johnson had been saying. 
5. Of TV coverage, I'll say they were competing among 
themselves. You could use 6-i crews in the field fighting 
for the best footage. This sometimes made things go slow. 
Hedrick Smith is now one of America's most celebrated 
journalists. His books on Russia and frequent TV appearances have made 
him very familiar to many Americans. Interviewed in late October, 1986 
by telephone in Washington, D.C. 
1. Yes. Officials spoke and reporters reported. The evidence 
is a very valid part of history. 
2. Yes. LBJ and the journalists were on the leading edge of 
history. 
3. I doubt if there were inaccurate stories. Stories were not 
knowingly inaccurate. 
4. No comment. 
5. Generally, yes. 
Lawrence Lichty, a Northwestern University professor and 
nationally known expert on the Vietnam War's TV coverage. He was 
interviewed by telephone September 16, 1986. 
1. Yes. Errors did creep into some satellite coverage, but it 
was quickly corrected. 
2. Yes, even though Johnson manipulated the media, and lied to 
reporters. 
3. Yes. The media did not focus enough on the fact that the 
war had come to the cities. There was drama during Tet, but 
in some instances there was newspaper exaggeration. 
4. Johnson tried to get others to do his "dirty work" for him. 
And it did not have much effect. He often overstated his 
case. 
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5. Overall, some were accurate and some were not. Yes, the 
reportage then can be used today. It can be trusted. In 
some cases there is not enough for the larger perspective. 
George Esper of the Associated Press is generally regarded as 
one of the most highly regarded journalists to have come out of the 
Vietnam War. He was interviewed in Boston by telephone on September 8, 
1986. 
1. The news coverage overall was very good. The Tet coverage 
certainly was on the mark. Of course, Tet was the watershed 
of the war. We did not completely report the crushing 
defeat of the Viet Cong. However, forty years from now the 
eyewitness accounts of the enemy attacks on the U.S. Embassy 
will be available for one and all to read. 
2. There was accurate adequate coverage in Vietnam. There 
definitely was adequate coverage of the U.S. Embassy even 
when there was conflict over battle accounts. Everything 
issued by the government was cleared with Washington. There 
was no challenge of the AP on accuracy of our stories--to my 
knowledge. 
3. Mistakes made? One stands out was we did not dig out the My 
Lai story. It only came out because of Seymour Hersh. 
4. Johnson did not give out accurate body counts of the Viet 
Cong dead. 
5. Generally, everything read or watched today would be 
accurate. Sure, there were some minor mistakes. The AP 
accounts absolutely can be relied upon. It is amazing to me 
now how accurate we were. We were accurate because we 
usually had trained and experienced people at the scene. I 
think now we provided a wealth of material. Of course, 
official documents would have to be examined today by 
students, teachers, and scholars to supplement our 
reportage. 
Was the news reportage from Vietnam honest and fair? 
It was overall with a few exceptions should be the only answer. 
There might be some triteness to this, but it is accurate: The 
best and the brightest of American journalism served in Vietnam. And 
they were courageous, too. 
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The censorship of news was extremely limited. Were reporters 
lied to? Absolutely, especially by President Johnson and some of his 
top aides. 
Perhaps, James Reston summed it up best in his book Deadline 
when writing: 
When the United States did begin to intervene [in Vietnam] in 
1961 and soon ran into trouble, Washington's reaction to the 
depressing military news was to blame the reporters. On October 22, 
1963 at a meeting in the White House, Kennedy suggested to Arthur 
Ochs Sulzberger and Turner Catledge that David Halberstam, one of 
our men in Saigon be transferred. "Don't you think that he's too 
close to the story?" Kennedy asked. But Sulzberger said he had no 
intention of transferring Halberstam, and Kennedy's intervention 
merely assured that David and his colleagues would continue to have 
the support of their publisher. 
Halberstam's stormy talent was that he was not only "close to 
the story" but on top of it. This is why he had also usually been 
ahead of the competition in his coverage of the civil rights 
struggles in the South and in his reporting from the Congo. It was 
precisely because he and his colleague Neil Sheehan cared so deeply 
and personally about the excesses and deceptions of the war that Lt. 
Col. John Paul Vann, who was exposing the lies of the official 
cornrnunigues, leaked the ugly facts to them for publication in the 
Times. 27 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF MEDIA COVERAGE 
FOR CLASSROOM USE; FORMAL EDUCATION 
Howard Elterman took the position in the January, 1988 Social 
Education that students should consider public participation in decision 
making! 1 Students should consider the press coverage by asking four 
questions: 
1. What key policies did the United States carry out in this 
theatre. 
2. What did government officials at the time tell the American 
people about these policies. 
3. How accurately did The New York Times, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. 
News and World Report, report on these issues nationally, for 
example. 
4. How accurately did the alternative media, New Republic, New 
Statesman, and the Guardian report on these matters. 2 
The last two questions get to the very heart of the democratic 
process in which the press performs the functions of keeping the public 
informed and serving as a protection against government abuses. 
Elterman also writes that coverage of the War, including Tet, 
was blasted by both the political left and right here in the U.S. The 
coverage was described as negative, sensational and subversive of the 
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overall struggle to defeat the communists. 
According to these key sources and analyses the Doves' said the 
journalists uncritically passed on government propaganda and failed to 
represent fairly the views of war opponents. 
The media definitely has admitted there was a flawed performance 
but blamed it on struggling to cover a war on the other side of the 
world and constant lying by government officials, the military, and 
South Vietnamese forces, and censorship of field reports by editors and 
publishers. 3 
Students and their professors seeking answers to the above must 
examine and reflect critically upon the problems of news reporting. 
There are always factors that influence accuracy and completeness. 
How well did the news media perform in influencing public 
opinion and government conduct? What, if anything, can be done to 
improve news coverage? 
One must agree with Elterman that there is comparatively 
widespread ignorance among both young people and adults about the 
Vietnam war. And conditions possibly have worsened since an ABC News--
Washin~ton Post poll was taken in 1985 that found that one-third of the 
adults polled did not know which side the U.S. supported in the war. 
As shocking, 75 percent of the adults interviewed in the same 
poll said they did not have a "clear idea" of what the war was about. 4 
Ronald J. Nurse and Dan B. Fleming said there are seven focus 
issues that the nation is struggling with. They are: (1) To what 
extent can the U.S. have both "guns and butter" in our time? (2) Can we 
support everyone who calls on us in the name of liberty? (3) Can a 
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postindustrial democracy sustain a prolonged limited war? (4) Should 
there be limitations on wartime dissent in a democracy? (5) Need war be 
declared? (6) What is the proper balance between the government's 
desire to manage information and the public's right to know? (7) How 
has the nuclear "balance of terror" affected th~ role and the status of 
the superpowers in international conflicts?5 
Nurse and Fleming write that textbooks on the Vietnam war give 
little attention to the impact of the media. This is most unfortunate. 
One question well could be examined by students: Do daily 
scenes of war on television heighten awareness of the grimness of a war? 
Or do they make people callous and lead them to tune out the entire 
experience. 
In turn, Nurse and Fleming point out that the growth of 
historical perception can be much aided by examining the media accounts, 
print and visual of various antiwar demonstrations. 
To flesh out the more abstract treatments, there is a certain 
poignancy to be found in one article titled "We Must Not Let Them Forget 
Vietnam." It was written by the late Charles DeBenedetti and published 
in January, 1988. 
DeBenedetti died January 27, 1987 while a Professor of 
Specialist History at the University of Toledo in Ohio. He was 
considered a specialist in the history of the peace movement. 
In 1961, DeBenedetti was eighteen years old and a student at 
Loyola University of Chicago. He received a 2-s deferment, married and 
pursued graduate studies in history. He then worked in the peace 
movement. 
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He wrote: 
While working against Washington's war for the unwinnable, I gained 
an entirely different understanding of the place of irrationality in 
modern American history. I decided that political irrationality was 
not so much a peculiar feature of mass social movements as it was an 
expression of unrestrained governmental power. 
DeBenedetti began teaching a course on "The U.S. and Vietnam" a 
few years before his death. He wrote that one student, a Vietnam 
veteran, asked that younger, non-vet students, not be allowed to forget 
the war. "Don't let them forget, don't ever,1"let them forget," the vet 
told Debenedetti. 6 
In a more extensive approach with many more additional insights 
"What Should We Tell Our Children About Vietnam?" was the title of a 
magazine article written for American Herita~e by Bill Mccloud and 
published in 1988. 7 Several journalists were among those who replied to 
McCloud's question. Here are their partial answers: 
Michael Arlen: 
In the end what I urge on your students is to live their lives in 
such a way that they not be burdened by what strikes me as 
democracy's most notable drawback--namely the seeming tendency of 
democratic peoples to be surprised by life. 8 
Peter Braestrup: 
I suggest that there are five things a junior high-school student 
should understand about the Vietnam War. 
1. The war was fought for a noble cause--to defend South Vietnam 
from a Communist takeover. 
2. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon tried to fight the war "on 
the cheap." 
3. American troops at least until President Nixon began troop 
withdrawals in 1969, fought as well as (or better than) their 
elders in World War II or Korea. 
4. The South Vietnamese ally was caught up in a civil war--abetted 
by outsiders from North Vietnam. 
5. Geography and political constraints made an allied victory 
impossible under the ground rules of 1965-73. 9 
so 
Malcolme Browne: 
Maybe the lesson of Vietnam was this: If you really want to win a 
war, you're best off fighting it on your own, with as little help 
from outside as possible .... For a junior high student (or anyone 
else) I think the best prescription is to study history, history, 
and more history_lO 
Philip Caputo: 
The two most important things for today's junior high school 
students to understand about the Vietnam War are: 
1. The United States learned in Vietnam that there are limits to 
its power and that to exceed those limits invites tragic 
consequences. 
2. The American soldiers who fought in the war did so out of sense 
of duty to their country, but their country betrayed them bv 
sending them to an unwinnable war. 11 
Jack Foisie: 
I think that young Americans ought to be told the unvarnished truth 
about the American performance in Vietnam--militarily and 
politically--even though much of it is unpleasant. 12 
John Hersey: 
It seems to me that the lessons of Vietnam spread far beyond the 
borders of that country: 
1. War is no way to solve problems between nations. 
2. Sophisticated weapons don't win wars: the spirit and 
determination of the people who fight are what determine the 
outcome. 
3. It is a mistake to think of communism as being one and the same 
in every country where it appears. 
4. We need to have more concern for poverty and hardship and 
sickness and backwardness of education in underdeveloped 
countries. 
5. So long as we preserve here at home the remarkable freedoms 
bequeathed to us by our Constitution and Bill of Rights, we have 
nothing to fear from communism. 13 
Marvin Kalb: 
First the political and military leaders of the U.S. cannot and must 
not lie to the American people about their major security concerns. 
Second, no controversial policy can ever succeed without the support 
of the American people. Third, no American must ever be called upon 
to sacrifice his life for a cause that is poorly understood, 
blurred, or deceptively explained by the administration. 14 
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Donald Oberdorfer, Jr.: 
Whether because t-he task was impossible from the start or bec,mse it 
was poorly executed or because in the end the American people lost 
confidence and terminated support--and I think there were elements 
of all three--the Vietnam War was a monumental failure of a giant 
scale national project. 15 
Pierre Salinger: 
Students should understand that our participation in Vietnam 
drastically changed the attitude of Americans about participating in 
overseas wars. 1 6 
William Tuohy: 
The most important thing for your students to understand about the 
Vietnam War is the limitation on the use of American power abroad. 17 
The trenchant observations and judgments made by these journalists in 
their responses to William McCloud are, to some extent understandable, 
in contrast to the less forthright and even weaker treatments in the 
textbooks. 
The Vietnam War in American History Textbooks 
While textbook teaching has been often decried and even 
castigated on occasion, social studies and history classrooms still 
heavily rely on it. To be sure creative teachers can and do supplement 
this source with a variety of other media projects, e.g., films, slides, 
tapes, VCRs, newspapers, periodicals and interviews with veterans, where 
these are available. However, we are only too aware of time and space 
constraints so that textbooks do remain a very important source of 
historical information for young Americans. 
Fleming and Nurse 18 have recently researched and evaluated 
developments in the treatment of the Vietnam War in American history 
textbooks. As might be expected with the passage of time, better 
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perspectives and better treatments developed. More concretely, in May 
1982, before they did their own review of textbooks published in 1978 
and 1979, they took note of the work of Frances Fitzgerald and the study 
done by William L. Griffin and John Marciano. Fitzgerald's was a more 
far-ranging work entitled America Revised: History Schoolbooks in the 
Twentieth Century (1979). It is no doubt because of its scope better 
known than Marciano and Griffin's, which was more narrowly focused. 
Teachin~ the Vietnam War: A Critical Examination of School Texts and 
Interpretive Comparative History Utilizin& the Penta~on Papers and Other 
Documents, also in 1979. Both these endeavors, with differing degrees 
of emphasis, endorsed the view of henry Steele Commager on the pervasive 
role of nationalism in the preparation and writing of history textbooks. 
There is one bias, one prejudice, one obsession, so pervasive and so 
powerful that it deserves special consideration nationalism. 
History, which should be the most cosmopolitan of studies, most 
catholic in its sympathies, most ecumenical in its interests, has, 
in the past century and a half become an instrument of nationalism. 
Nationalism is, no doubt, the most powerful force in modern history, 
and it is hardly surprising that it should have captured 
historiography and enslaved historians. 19 
In the same tenor, the Billington Committee of the American 
Historical Association had stated in 1966, that "nationalistic bias is 
as persistent in today's schoolbooks [referring to texts of the early 
1960s] as in those used a generation ago. 1120 However, they concluded it 
was not as blatant as the deliberate distortions of many nineteenth-
century historians and their nationalistic fervors. 
Thus, it is refreshing to note that the National Science 
Foundation's Project Span in 1980 took this view: "Today's texts tend 
to be less chauvinistic and less narrowly nationalistic. Controversial 
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topics are still treated cautiously but they are treated, and that has 
not always been the case." 21 
Fleming and Nurse go on to proffer the same valuable 
generalizations on the basis of the ten texts they investigated (all 
came out between 1977 and 1981). As might be expected, the textbooks 
dealt primarily with the military and political sides of Vietnam War, to 
the neglect of what to Fitzgerald were very important understandings of 
Vietnamese history and culture. They also seemed to play down the 
struggle between "doves" and "hawks" over moral issues such as the Kent 
State shooting, the massacre at My Lai and chemical warfare, for 
example. 
While Fleming and Nurse agree about the neglect of different 
moral issues, they did find that all the textbooks did deal with the 
anti-war protest and most of them did bring in the Penta&on Papers. 
They state their conclusions in the 1982 study in this wise: 
Most of the textbooks in our study offer a too sketchy account of 
the Vietnam War. However, the deficiencies of the narratives are 
not those of distortion, dishonesty, inaccuracy, or bias. The 
problem tends to be the neglect of certain key topics. This 
omission is particularly true of war aims, moral controversies and 
"lessons" of the war. This deficiency can be explained, in part, by 
the limitations of space available to authors, which is an inherent 
problem for all survey textbooks. In essence, therefore, the 
changes made by Fitzgerald's sweeping study, as well as those of 
Griffin/Marciano (directed against older textbook editions) continue 
to have considerable validity. However, the more recent textbooks 
are more objective and more accurate, and they show a marked 
domination in the degree of nationalistic bias. 22 
In 1988, Fleming and Nurse updated their study with what they 
felt was a really representative cross-section of textbooks in national 
use. They investigated how these recent textbooks handled a number of 
key topics regarding the Vietnam War, such as the Geneva Agreement of 
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1954, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the anti-war movement, war aims, the 
legacy of the war, and Vietnamese culture. Their conclusions are 
encouraging; progress seems to have been definitely made. 
Overall, the mid-1980s textbooks provide improved treatment of 
the war in Vietnam. They generally point out the United States' errors 
and tackle controversial topics such as the Gulf of Tonkin incident and 
our support of the Ngo Dinh Hiem. 
They still ignore the culture of Vietnam, however, but have improved 
their discussion of the costs of the war, particularly with respect 
to reexamining the role of the United States in the world. Just as 
the American public appears to be taking a new look at the war in 
Vietnam, so history textbooks seem gradually to be presenting a new 
"truth." 23 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The interpretation of the Tet offensive of 1968 continues to be 
contested, as then, so now by "hawks" and "doves" in varying degrees but 
persistently. This study has attempted to probe this problem in the 
context of the entire war: with special concern for teaching of 
American history in the junior high and high school grades. 
The meaning of Tet was fought over recently by such luminaries 
as Norman Podhoretz and Noam Chomsky. On the one hand, Podhoretz sees 
Tet as the time when Congress, the people and the media gave up on the 
Vietnam War. On the other hand, Chomsky sees its aftermath as showing 
forth the reliance of American forces on increasingly violent tactics 
(My Lai for example). 
Much ink has been spilt on speculation as to how such a military 
defeat at Tet has been changed into a decisive strategic/political 
victory for the North Vietnamese. 
Apart from the stark record that the Vietnamese--both North and 
South--bore the brunt of the conflict, Americans naturally wish to 
assess the importance of Tet and the Vietnam War for our people, 
especially for our heirs and beneficiaries. Consequently, American 
arguments about Tet go on. Notwithstanding, reactions by our media 
people and reactions to them have much to teach us and our children. To 
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what extent is Tet a victory misunderstood? The debate goes on in all 
our classrooms. 
With regard to the ten core interviews with the on-the-scene 
correspondents, some tentative conclusions seem to be in order. They 
were asked five questions. They are repeated here: 
1. Was the news coverage of the Tet military action reliable enough to 
be used by future teachers, students and historians? If not, why 
not? 
There were yes answers from seven respondents. 
The answers from three were qualified and entered some reservations. 
2. Was there accurate coverage during Tet of President Johnson and his 
administration in Washington, D.C. and in Vietnam? If not, why not? 
"No" was the answer from three. 
"Don't know" was the answer from two. 
Two said "yes" to Vietnam coverage. Two others answered "yes" for 
both Washington, D.C. and Vietnam. One said "yes" and "no." 
3. What mistakes were made during Tet by the news media in Vietnam and 
Washington? 
The answers were varied as these examples show: 
• Some coverage suggested the Communist offensive as being more 
successful than it actually was. 
• The primary mistake was not reporting Tet as a tactical disaster 
for the North Vietnamese. 
• Executions at Hue got little play. 
• Many mistakes and misunderst;::ndings of the historical forces at 
work fail -d to realize there was military disaster over there 
(for the North Vietnamese). 
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Little documentation on what the North Vietnamese did. 
• Mechanical mistakes as on any big breaking story. 
• The North Vietnamese atrocities were under reported; initial 
judgments were later proved wrong. 
• Not knowingly inaccurate. 
• Not enough focus on city invasions. 
4. Was Peter Braestrup accurate in his accusations of President 
Johnson's alleged "willy nilly" conduct before and during Tet? 
Two answered "Don't know." 
One answered "somewhat." 
Seven responded "yes." 
5. Are the available radio, TV tapes and news accounts, periodicals and 
books on Tet accurate enough for use today by students, teachers, 
and scholars? If not, why not? 
"Yes" was the answer from seven. 
"Mixed" was one answer and the respondent wanted all sides examined. 
One said there was "some sensationalism." 
One said the TV coverage was accurate and usable. 
A pattern that seems to emerge from the above analysis is that 
students, teachers, and scholars can trust the historical accounts of 
this water-shed battle, Tet, and of the Vietnam War in general, that 
have been based on the materials generated by the journalists and their 
media colleagues. The added perspectives of eighteen years give their 
views a genuine maturity. 
At the same time initial mistakes and some inaccuracies are 
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adverted to and admitted with appropriate qualifiers that really serves 
to support the overall veracity and integrity of the correspondents. 
Thus, these interviews in fine go counter to the occasional allegations 
that the media especially after Tet turned military victory into 
political defeat. Their accounts, of course, were variously interpreted 
by "hawks" and "doves." 
This author seeks now to offer his own response to the questions 
that were asked of and answered by ten key journalists who covered 
Vietnam: 
1. Was the news coverage of the Tet military action reliable 
enough to be used by future teachers, students and historians? If not, 
why not? 
Author's response: It can be used. However, it would be well 
for any user to be mindful of the admonitions from Philip Knightley. 
Knightley's very perceptive interpretation of television 
coverage of the Vietnam war is relevant. 
Years of television news of the war have left viewers with a 
blur of images consisting mainly of helicopters landing in jungle 
clearings, soldiers charging into undergrowth, wounded being loaded 
onto helicopters, artillery and mortar fire, air strikes on distant 
targets, napalm canisters turning slowly in the sky, and a 
breathless correspondent poking a stick microphone under an army 
officer's nose and asking, "What's happening up there, Colonel?" 
(The only honest answer came in 1972, from a captain on Highway 13. 
"I wish the hell I knew," he said.) The networks claimed the combat 
footage was what the public wanted; that concentrating on combat 
prevented the film's being out of date if it was delayed in 
transmission; that it was difficult to shoot anything other than 
combat film when only three or four minutes were available in the 
average news program for events in Vietnam; and that the illusion of 
American progress created by combat footage shot from only one side 
was balanced by what the correspondent had to say. 
Knightley argues that the network claims are false. He contends 
that the aforementioned combat footage did not adequately convey all 
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aspects of combat. This author is a World War II infantry combat 
veteran and agrees with Knightley. 
The author also is in strong agreement with this summary by 
Knightley: 
American television executives showed too little courage in 
their approach to Vietnam. They followed each other into paths the 
army had chosen for them. They saw the war as "an American war in 
Asia--and that's the only story the American audience is interested 
in," and they let other, equally important, aspects of Vietnam go 
uncovered. 
This author has not ever uncovered legitimate evidence that 
there was deliberate and intentional distortions in the filming or 
reporting of the Tet battles. Major inaccuracies apparently were 
quickly identified and corrected. 
Mistakes were made in selectivity, editing, and eventual 
placement of photos, film and news stories. These mistakes must be 
considered in the larger context of journalism realities. 
2. Was there accurate coverage during Tet of President Johnson 
and his administration in Washington, D. C. and in Vietnam. If not, why 
not? 
The news, in this author's opinion, was accurately reported. 
Dozens of books over the years have chronicled the lies and obfuscations 
of Johnson and his administration. Reporters soon became distrustful of 
Johnson and his people both in Washington and in Vietnam. When 
possible, reporters challenged Johnson and his people as to the facts 
and the veracity of their statements. 
3. What mistakes were made during Tet by the news media in 
Vietnam and Washington? 
At times, the journalists were not aggressive or hard-charging 
enough. They were not skeptical enough nor did they dig deep enough. 
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And editors in both print and TV were sometimes "sloppy" and did not 
challenge their own people to be accurate and complete. 
There were certainly mistakes in the early days of Tet that led 
to the general impression that the U.S. had suffered a major military 
defeat. Time and subsequent events have proved this was not so. The 
mistakes were not intentional and often of an accidental nature. 
4. Was Peter Braestrup accurate in his accusations of President 
Johnson's alleged "willy nilly" conduct before and during Tet? 
Yes, Braestrup was accurate for the following reasons with which 
this author concurs. 
1. Six months prior to the Tet attacks, he orchestrated a 
"progress" campaign; to shore up public support, he and his subordinates 
presented an optimistic view of the Administration's limited war of 
attrition in Vietnam. 
2. He was warned by the military from Saigon that Hanoi was 
planning a big battle, but did not warn his fellow Americans. He only 
stressed his quest for Peace." 
3. When Tet did come, he gave a hasty reaction, not on 
television, and left detailed explanations to his aides. 
4. He took major retaliations against the enemy. 
5. It was a month after Tet that Johnson announced a new 
bombing pause, his withdrawal from the 1968 presidential race and a new 
peace offer. 
6. Johnson did not give the media or the public a credible 
coherent explanation. 
5. Are the available radio, TV tapes and news accounts, 
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periodicals and books on Tet accurate enough for use today by students, 
teachers and scholars? If not, why not. 
Yes, with some qualifications. Again, scholars, teachers and 
students today will have to exercise some caution in accepting and 
understanding materials. 
This entire study underscores the importance of comprehending 
how the media people do and do not function in a crisis. 
To further recapitulate the constant crisis situation in which 
reporters and photographers found themselves in this most photographed 
of all American wars it is important to summarize the challenges under 
which they worked. 
In the early 1960s, there was other enormous pressure on 
journalists here and in Vietnam from U.S. leaders and politicians "to 
get on our team." Unfavorable news reports from Vietnam were considered 
almost treasonous. On of the best accounts of this is from Knightley: 
Not it was Time's turn to join the team. In August 1963, 
Charles Mohr, the magazine's chief correspondent in South-East Asia, 
and Merton Perry, who had been a Time stringer in Saigon since 1962, 
wrote, at the request of the head office, a long story on the Saigon 
correspondents and their battle with the American mission and an 
even longer round-up of the war situation. The latter began: "The 
war in Vietnam is being lost." When it appeared in Time, this line 
had disappeared. Things were going well in Vietnam, the article 
said, and "government troops are fighting better than ever." The 
article on the Saigon press corps did not appear, but on September 
20 another article was published. It was a vicious attack on the 
correspondents, and it began: "For all the light it shed, the news 
that U.S. newspaper readers got from Saigon might just as well have 
been printed in Vietnamese." The article accused the correspondents 
of pooling "their convictions, information, misinformation and 
grievances," of becoming themselves "a part of the Vietnam's 
confusion," and of producing material that was "prone to 
distortions." 
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When the article appeared, Time's chief of correspondents, 
Richard Clurman, who had tried to have it stopped, called Mohr to 
placate him. Mohr said that unless he could have equal space to 
reply personally ... , he would resign. Time would not agree to 
this, so Mohr and Perry went. 
Washington kept up the pressure. News reports from Vietnam, 
said Pierre Salinger, the White House press secretary, were 
emotional and inaccurate. As a stream of highly regarded reporters 
and special writers went out to Vietnam, including several Second 
World War correspondents, and the columnist Joseph Alsop. All 
decided that the war was going well. Frank Conniff, a Hearst 
writer, blamed the pessimistic reporting on American editors. The 
fact that young reporters, most of them in their twenties, had been 
assigned to report an involved story reflected little credit on the 
prescience of their employers, he wrote. President Kennedy felt the 
same way, and he tried to get rid of his particular bete noire, 
David Halberstam, by asking the New York Times' publisher, "Punch" 
Sulzberger, to reassign him. Sulzberger not only refused to do so, 
but also cancelled a two-week holiday Halberstam was about to take, 
in case that it should appear that the Times had yielded to 
Kennedy's pressure. So the impression of these early years of 
Vietnam is of courageous and skilled correspondents fighting a long 
and determined action for the right to report the war as they saw 
it. 
There is only one flaw in this: the correspondents were not 
questioning the American intervention itself, but only its 
effectiveness. Most correspondents, despite what Washington thought 
about them, were just as interested in seeing the United States win 
the war as was the Pentagon. What the correspondents questioned was 
not American policy, but the tactics used to implement that policy, 
in particular the backing of Deim as the "white hope" of Vietnam. 
"We would have liked nothing better than to believe that the war was 
going well, and that it would eventually be won," Halberstam wrote 
later. "But it was impossible to believe these things without 
denying the evidence of our senses." Mohr was embarrassed when he 
found that his stand against Time had made him something of an anti-
war hero. "Everyone thought I left because I was against the war. 
I just thought it wasn't working. I didn't come to think of it as 
immoral until the very end." 
A recent summary in 1991 by the redoubtable long-time New York 
Times reporter, columnist and editor, James Reston recapitulates with 
forthright cogency the considered judgment of many on the role of the 
reporters of Vietnam: 
They were vilified for their pains, denounced by the government, 
sometimes mistrusted by their own editors, condemned by some of 
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their own colleagues in Washington, and even blamed by some 
officials for the nation's final humiliation and defeat. I thought 
this was unfair and still believe that these reporters, including 
the men with their television cameras on the battlefield, did a 
better job under more difficult circumstances than any other band of 
war correspondents in my time. 
Reston noted again how early on the White House and its 
bureaucracy, namely President Kennedy and his advisers, including such 
men as the militant Joseph Alsop tried to persuade the publisher of the 
New York Times, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger to do something about the 
reporting of David Halberstam. They, in fact, urged strongly that he be 
sent home. However, Sulzberger, fortunately for the freedom of 
information position, stood his ground and encouraged Halberstam to keep 
on. Reston again: 
Halberstam was a human lie detector, with an explosive temper, a 
profane vocabulary, a talent for getting into brawls, and the 
physique to muscle out of them. Sheehan was a gentler sort. His 
tours of the blasted Vietnam villages on either side of the line 
reduced him to tears, and he was so admiring of Colonel Vann's 
courage and determination to tell the truth that he spent seventeen 
years after the war writing a book about him--A Bri~ht Shinin& Lie 
which won the Pulitzer Prize. Kennedy was not the only one who 
complained about Sheehan and Halberstam. 
In a quandary as an editor back in the States, Reston even 
proposed that the New York Times print side-by-side the regularly 
contradictory unofficial and official reports from Vietnam. 
Nobody was quite satisfied with this fifty-fifty display. The 
officials in Washington complained that we were questioning their 
judgment, which of course we were, and even members of our own staff 
thought we couldn't make up our minds. 
In view of these swirling controversies, Reston decided to go to 
Vietnam again to personally observe the reporters, military and 
civilian, at work. His vivid account of the "Five O'Clock Follies" 
presents a very telling set of insights. 
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These were presided over by Harold Kaplan, an intelligent and 
amiable official with a long Filipino cigar in his teeth. The 
briefings usually produced between twelve and fifteen single-spaced 
pages of reports on the day's events, for this was not one war but 
sixty-three different wars in different provinces and offshore in 
the China Sea. Kaplan permitted some ragging questions for about 
fifteen minutes, all ending at about six o'clock in a scoreless tie. 
Then began the tedious task of checking the reports and trying to 
transmit the stories to New York over a communications system that, 
in the opinion of the reporters, justified the Vietnamese rebellion 
against the French. 
Reston was clearly and, in the author's view justifiably 
gratified by the military's policy of permitting reporters to get to the 
battle scene, even offering transportation and he was also impressed 
with how the reporters had gained the confidence of officers and men on 
the battlefield. He further extolled the work of the TV reporters and 
their cameras and graphically describes their impact. 
I have tossed a few slurs at television in these pages, but I have 
to say that its cameras brought the human tragedy of the Vietnam War 
home to the American people more vividly than the newspapers could 
describe it. They showed the brutality of the Communists in the 
villages, but it was left to Morely Safer of CBS to show on film 
U.S. Marines setting fire to the thatched peasant houses of the 
villagers. This dramatized what was happening not only to the enemy 
but also to our own men, and it raised such an uproar at home that 
the marine command ordered a stop to the practice. 
Reston's fulsome praise of the journalist's work, both in print 
and non-print was not limited to the New York Times people, though he 
knew them best. He also singled out among the many who did such an 
outstanding job: Peter Arnett, of the A.P., Ed Morgan of ABC, Ward Just 
of the Washington Post and the ubiquitous Frances Fitzgerald of the New 
Yorker. His summation of the difficulties under which all involved 
worked are deeply perceptive. 
The war in Vietnam was so alien to the American experience and such 
a tangle of conflicting cultures, interest, memories, religions, and 
personal, regional, and tribal ambitions that it defied precise 
definition and was almost beyond comprehension. 
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Even the words normally used to describe a war were misleading. 
It was not a war in the usual sense. It was a series of violent 
actions, some rather like Al Capone's gang raids in Chicago, some 
like the frontier skirmishes in the French and Indian War, still 
others like the savage encounters between the Americans and the 
Japanese in the Pacific island caves of 1945--all this with the 
Strategic Air Command, of all things, bombing guerrillas, of all 
people, in tunnels in the Vietnamese forests, of all places. 
It really needed a new vocabulary, Vietnam was not a nation but 
a physical and strategic entity broken into conspiratorial families, 
clans, sects, hamlets, and regions by many generations of Mandarin, 
French, Japanese, and religious influence. 
In that situation, it was almost impossible to perform the 
reporting function of reducing diversity to identity. All you could 
do was try to illustrate just how complex human political and 
military relations were. 
When he returned home with all these puzzlements fermenting in 
his mind, Reston proceeded to defend his fellows vigorously against the 
chronic complaints from administration officials about the negative 
reporting from Vietnam. Soon after he wrote that "with the bombing of 
targets on the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong it (the Johnson 
administration] had now done almost everything it said it wouldn't do, 
except bomb China." 
He continues in the most personal way an account of his 
confrontation with the beleaguered President Lyndon Johnson. 
When I got home, I heard the same complaints from administration 
officials about "negative reporting" out of Saigon, and did 
everything I could to defend the integrity and accuracy of my 
colleagues in Saigon. I wrote that the Johnson administration might 
finally get over its agony in Vietnam, but it would probably never 
regain the people's confidence in its judgment and veracity. With 
the bombing of targets on the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong, it 
had now done almost everything it said it wouldn't do, except bomb 
China. It said it was not seeking a military solution to the war, 
and it was obviously seeking precisely that; it said it was there 
merely to help a legitimate government defend itself, and it ended 
up by supporting a military clique that was not a government, not 
legitimate, and not really defending itself. 
The president called me to the White House and gave me "the 
works." He denounced my colleagues in Saigon in terms I could 
hardly bear after my trip, and he asked me, "Why don't you get on 
the team? You have only one president. I had heard it all before 
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and said I thought he was trying to save face. He stood up and 
showed me to the door. "I'm not trying to save my face," he said, 
"I'm trying to .save my ass." 
These are some lessons our children and their teachers can learn from 
this welter of conflicting charges and countercharges. 
As John McDonough, a free-lance writer, pithily stated it in the 
Chica&o Tribune, Tempo Section on May 26, 1990: 
To a reporter, war is always the good old days. Peace may have 
given us record military budgets and too many journalism students. 
But only war can build a five-star general or a legendary 
correspondent. Maybe this is why those who write the proverbial 
"first drafts of history" as war correspondents often return to 
write the second as historians. 
One such is Morley Safer who so incensed President Johnson with 
his on the scene Vietnam reports. In his "Flashbacks: One Returning to 
Vietnam," he said that Vietnam was uniquely a follow-up to World War II. 
The witnesses to WWII see it all ... from the disillusionment of 
the '20s that shaped their first world views through the moral 
certainties of Vietnam that challenged their prestige as senior 
journalists. 
Eric Sevareid is another such witness, since he was in all the 
major events for CBS from the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939 until the 
end of the war in Vietnam. Says Sevareid: 
There was an epic irony here. We became the victim of our own 
victory. This is always the dilemma of a great power. You 
oscillate from Munichs to Vietnams. You fail to use power when you 
should. Then you become too quick to use it when you shouldn't. 
It's the misery of the mighty. 
On the other side of the fence, senior correspondents of the 
stature of Richard C. Hottelet and Larry Le Suer, keenly recollecting 
Chamberlain and Munich were strenuously opposed to any form of 
appeasement. It was, of course, the younger generation of reporters 
such as Safer that used the camera so successfully to belie official 
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reports of military actions, e.g., the outrageous burning of the village 
at Cam Ne. The debate they launched, especially when such influential 
powerhouses as Eric Sevareid and Walter Cronkite came aboard, is now 
history. It would not be long before Lyndon B. Johnson would withdraw 
from the presidential race. 
The conclusions drawn by the Lessons of the Vietnam War, the 
previously cited modular textbook that emerged from the Center for 
Social Studies Education at Pittsburgh are echoed in this study. 
Nations have long memories. Vietnam will continue to have a 
powerful influence on American foreign policy until some other 
cataclysmic event replaces it. It is therefore urgent that we study 
and learn from it. In doing this, we must remember that history 
does not yield precise, explicit answers to today's most pressing 
questions. Indeed, when used improperly, history is a mischievous 
guide. We should we wary of those ,,ho justify present-day 
commitments and strategies on the basis of what was done or not done 
in Vietnam. 
On the other hand, careful analysis of how we got into Vietnam 
and why we failed can provide vital perspectives on today's 
problems. It can educate us about who we are and how we deal with 
other peoples and can offer cautionary principles, such as those 
cited above, that can help guide our leaders in making decisions. 
The past is indeed prologue, and we cannot begin to deal with 
today's most pressing issues without coming to terms with the 
longest and most divisive war the nation has fought. 
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Their names are not to be found engraved on the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial wall in Washington, D.C. Nor most anywhere today. 
For they died working as journalists covering a war that was both 
hated and misunderstood. They perished, too, in Laos and Cambodia. 
Their graves are scattered and the bodies of some still have not 
been located, but now they must be presumed dead. 
The known who died in Vietnam are: 
Michael Y. Birch Free Lance 
John L. Cantwell Time-Life 
Sam Castan Look magazine 
Dickey Chapelle Free Lance 
Charles Challapah Free Lance 
Charles Eggleston UPI 
Robert J. Ellison Free Lance 
Ignacio Ezcurra Free Lance 
Bernard B. Fall Free Lance 
Ronald D. Gallagher Free Lance 
Bernard Kolenberg AP 
Ronald B. Laramy Reuters 
Hiromichi Mine UPI 
Huynh Thanh My AP 
Oliver Noonan AP 
Bruce Pigott Reuters 
Jerry Rose Free Lance 
Tatsuo Sakai Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
Paul Savanuck Stars and Stri:ges 
Philippa Schuyler 
Francois Sully 
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Pieter Ronald Van Thirl 
Reported dead in Laos were: 
Larry Burrows 
Henri Huet 
Kent Potter 
Keisaburo Shimamoto 
Killed in Cambodia were: 
Frank Frosch 
Gerald Miller 
Koichi Sawada 
George Syvertsen 
Manchester Union Leader 
Newsweek 
Free Lance 
Life 
AP 
UPI 
Newsweek 
UPI 
CBS 
UPI 
CBS 
It is ironic that only one journalist is not listed missing in 
Vietnam itself. He is Alexander Shimkin of Newsweek. 
Still missing and now presumed dead somewhere in Cambodia are: 
Claud Arpin Newsweek 
Dieter Bellendorf NBS 
Gilles Caron Gamma Agency of Paris 
Roger Colne NBC 
Sean Flynn Time 
Georg Gensluckner Free Lance 
Welles Hagen NBC 
Guy Hannoteaux L'Express 
Alan Hirons UPI 
Taizo Ichinose Free Lance 
Tomaharu Ishi 
Akira Kusaka 
Richard A Martin 
Willy Mettler 
Terry Reynolds 
Kojiro Sakai 
Dana Stone 
Toshiihi Suzuki 
Yujiro Takagi 
Takeshi Yanagisawa 
Yoshihiko Yurigo 
Yoshihko Waku 
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CBS 
Fuji Television 
Free Lance 
Free Lance 
UPI 
CBS 
CBS 
Nippon Dempa News 
Fuji Television 
Nippon Dempa News 
Nippon Dempa News 
NBC 
They total 53. Thirty are known dead and 23 must now be 
presumed dead. They must be acknowledged in any serious analysis of the 
coverage of the Vietnam war. This study focuses on the Tet offensive coverage 
that lasted approximately two months. The sacrifices made by journalists 
throughout the war also deserve recognition here. 
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